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Abstract  
As science seeks to make generalisations, a science of individual peculiarities encounters 
intricate challenges. This article explores these challenges by applying the Transdisciplinary 
Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals (TPS-Paradigm) and by 
exploring taxonomic “personality” research as an example. Analyses of researchers’ 
interpretations of the taxonomic “personality” models, constructs and data that have been 
generated in the field reveal widespread erroneous assumptions about the abilities of 
previous methodologies to appropriately represent individual-specificity in the targeted 
phenomena. These assumptions, rooted in everyday thinking, fail to consider that individual-
specificity and others’ minds cannot be directly perceived, that abstract descriptions cannot 
serve as causal explanations, that between-individual structures cannot be isomorphic to 
within-individual structures, and that knowledge of compositional structures cannot explain 
the process structures of their functioning and development. These erroneous assumptions 
and serious methodological deficiencies in widely used standardised questionnaires have 
effectively prevented psychologists from establishing taxonomies that can comprehensively 
model individual-specificity in most of the kinds of phenomena explored as “personality”, 
especially in experiencing and behaviour and in individuals’ functioning and development. 
Contrary to previous assumptions, it is not universal models but rather different kinds of 
taxonomic models that are required for each of the different kinds of phenomena, variations 
and structures that are commonly conceived of as “personality”. Consequently, to 
comprehensively explore individual-specificity, researchers have to apply a portfolio of 
complementary methodologies and develop different kinds of taxonomies, most of which 
have yet to be developed. Closing, the article derives some meta-desiderata for future 
research on individuals’ “personality”. 
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To answer the fundamental question “Why do individuals differ?”, researchers have invested 
great efforts in establishing “personality”1 models over the last century with the aim of 
providing comprehensive accounts of individual peculiarities and of exploring the 
mechanisms and processes that can explain individual functioning and development. Today, 
there are many competing models from different lines of research each based on different 
theories and different images of human nature (Fahrenberg 2004; Shotter 1975) and each 
derived and applied using different methodologies (Mischel, Shoda & Ayduk 2007).  
Many controversies ensued among the proponents of different models and theories. 
A central controversy arose with regard to the scientific dictum scientia non est 
individuorum—the fundamental idea that science seeks regularities and lawfulness through 
abstraction and generalisation from unique events and thus, cannot be devoted to exploring 
individual cases. To establish the discipline’s status as a science, many psychologists 
therefore employ nomothetic approaches (from the Greek nomos, the law) that aim to 
identify universal principles and generalised concepts that are applicable to all individuals in 
the same way. But from the very beginning, many other psychologists have pointed out that 
universal and generalised concepts cannot appropriately represent the particular individual 
as he or she is encountered in research, clinical settings and everyday life nor can they 
explain individual functioning and development (Allport 1937; Kelly 1955). These 
psychologists therefore reject the idea that “the unique individual is simply the point of 
intersection of a number of quantitative variables” (Eysenck 1952, p.18) and advocate for 
pursuing ideographic approaches (from the Greek ideos, the peculiar) to seek a holistic 
understanding of the single individual (Lamiell 2003; Salvatore & Valsiner 2010; Salvatore et 
al. 2013). 
Other controversies occurred over the question of what “personality” actually is. 
Some researchers conceive of “personality” as socially attributed and socioculturally 
constructed (Kelly 1955; Shweder & Sullivan 1990), thus involving social perception and 
judgement (Goldberg 1990; John, Angleitner & Ostendorf 1988). Some researchers who 
focus on external perspectives on individuals take into consideration not only behaviour but 
also morphology (Eysenck 1947; Guildford 1959), whereas others explicitly do not (Norman 
1967). Some other researchers, in turn, focus on internal perspectives on individuals by 
conceiving of “personality” as the dynamic organisation of their psychophysical system 
(Allport 1937). Still other researchers incorporate both external and internal perspectives by 
considering individuals’ behaviours and their thoughts and emotions (Pervin & John 1997).  
Further controversies arose with regard to whether “personality” reflects rather stable 
inner structures or dynamic processes (Fleeson 2001; Giordano 2014; Mischel & Shoda 
1998). Proponents of structural concepts have debated about the numbers and qualities of 
the particular constructs that constitute taxonomic models (Ashton & Lee 2005; Cloninger 
1986; Costa & McCrae 1992; Goldberg 1990; Tellegen 1993). Controversies about causal 
explanations arose on the concepts of human nature (Fahrenberg 2004; Shotter 1975) on 
which different research paradigms are based. At their core, these controversies revolved 
around the question of whether individuals are influenced more by their internal properties or 
by their external contexts in a given moment (cf. the person-situation controversy; e.g., 
Bandura 1986; Mischel 1968) as well as across their lifetime (cf. the nature-nurture 
controversy; e.g., Freud 1915; Loehlin 1992).  
Contemporary psychologists recognise that various research perspectives are 
important for exploring why individuals differ and increasingly integrate formerly competing 
theoretical perspectives (e.g., biological, psychodynamic-motivational, behavioural-learning, 
social-cognitive and humanistic perspectives) as interconnected levels into overarching 
“personality systems”. But can such integrative models really provide “a much more coherent 
view of the whole functioning individual in the social world” (Mischel, Shoda & Ayduk 2007) 
as frequently assumed? Why then did the controversies arise in the first place? What 
                                               
1
 The term “personality” put in quotation marks indicates that its definitions vary and that different 
researchers use this term to refer to different kinds of phenomena (see Uher 2014a, b in this trilogy). 
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actually is at the bottom of all these controversies? How can they be resolved—and have 
these controversies actually been resolved?  
This trilogy of articles 
This trilogy of articles (Uher 2014a, b, c) applies the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-
Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals (briefly referred to as the TPS-Paradigm) to 
explicate and critically examine the basic metatheories and methodologies that researchers 
explicitly and/or implicitly apply to explore individuals using the example of taxonomic 
“personality” research.  
The first article (Uher 2014a) highlighted some profound challenges that researchers 
of individuals encounter. It introduced basic fundamentals of the TPS-Paradigm focussing on 
the philosophical presuppositions that it makes about research on individuals including basic 
epistemological and metatheoretical concepts for exploring individuals as living organisms. 
Philosophy-of-science foundations underlying research methodologies in general and 
scientific quantification in particular were elaborated to derive basic principles for the 
targeted matching of methodologies to each of the various kinds of phenomena explored in 
individuals. On the basis of these foundations, the article then explored the metatheories and 
methodologies that are used and/or needed to investigate each given kind of phenomenon 
in individuals in general. Building on these general implications, the article derived special 
implications for exploring individuals’ “personality” that the TPS-Paradigm conceives of as 
individual-specificity in all of the various kinds of phenomena explored in individuals.  
The second article (Uher 2014b) elaborated the special implications for research on 
individual-specificity and applied them to explore the three methodological steps that are 
required for developing comprehensive “personality” taxonomies—1) the approaches used 
to select the phenomena and events to be studied, 2) the methods used to generate data 
about the selected phenomena and events and 3) the reduction principles used to extract 
the “most important” kinds of individual-specific variations and to construct taxonomies. By 
analysing some currently popular taxonomic models as examples, frequent mismatches 
were revealed in all three steps between the researchers’ (explicit and implicit) metatheories 
about “personality” and the abilities of previous methodologies to capture the particular kinds 
of phenomena toward which they are targeted. It was shown how erroneous assumptions 
and the widespread psychometric practice of radically matching the methodological tools 
(e.g., standardised questionnaires) to researchers’ preconceived ideas and to pre-existing 
statistical theories have seriously hampered taxonomic investigations of the various kinds of 
phenomena explored in individuals. For all three steps of taxonomy development, the article 
highlighted ways in which methodologies that are suitable for comprehensively identifying 
individual-specificity can be derived and (further) developed from both established and novel 
theoretical approaches. 
The present third article (Uher 2014c) builds on the insights gained in the two 
previous articles in order to explore researchers’ theoretical interpretations of previous 
taxonomic “personality” models, constructs and data regarding the phenomena that these 
represent. After summarising and elaborating on some relevant fundamentals of the TPS-
Paradigm (part I), the article presents (part II) philosophy-of-science analyses that reveal 
widespread erroneous assumptions, rooted in everyday thinking, about the abilities of 
previous “personality” taxonomies to appropriately represent the targeted phenomena. In line 
with concerns that have been voiced repeatedly, the article shows that previous taxonomic 
models have largely failed to empirically represent individual-specificity in experiencing and 
behaviour and in individuals’ functioning and development—psychology’s core objects of 
research. The article then (part III) derives implications for comprehensive explorations of 
individual-specificity and offers novel insights about the different kinds of taxonomic models 
that are required to comprehensively explore individuals’ “personality” and that have yet to 
be developed. Closing (part IV) the philosophy-of-science analyses presented in this trilogy, 
the article derives some meta-desiderata for future research on individuals and on 
“personality”. 
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I) The Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals 
(TPS-Paradigm) 
The philosophical, metatheoretical and methodological foundations of the TPS-
Paradigm are based on various lines of thought from both philosophy and psychology. 
Space constraints limit the degree to which these historical precursors and other related 
lines of research can be referred to in this trilogy and to which meaningful links exist that can 
be further explored and developed. This article can also introduce only those fundamentals 
that are directly relevant for the analyses presented with regard to researchers’ theoretical 
interpretations in taxonomic “personality” research (for details see Uher 2014a, b in this 
trilogy). For more comprehensive accounts of the TPS-Paradigm and its links to other lines 
of thought see Uher (2014d, in prep.2).  
Philosophical foundations  
The TPS-Paradigm for Research on Individuals applied in this trilogy is a paradigm 
because it comprises interrelated philosophical, metatheoretical and methodological 
frameworks for exploring individuals. It is transdisciplinary because in these frameworks, 
concepts, approaches and methods from various scientific disciplines are systematically 
integrated, further developed and complemented by novel ones (Uher 2011a; 2013). It is 
called a philosophy-of-science paradigm because it emphasises the importance of making 
explicit the philosophical presuppositions that are being made in a given scientific system 
and the metatheories and methodologies that are derived from them and it aims to make 
these explicit in the fields that it explores.  
Philosophical presuppositions are rational structures that are necessary for any 
scientific system to function and that can originate only from outside the given system that is 
built upon them and in which they guide the development of theories and methodologies. For 
this reason, philosophical presuppositions cannot be rationally justified or validated within 
the system for which they are formulated (cf. incompleteness theorem; Gödel 1931) and are 
therefore also called absolute presuppositions (Collingwood 1940). Philosophy-of-science 
analyses are important for revealing possible differences in the absolute presuppositions that 
are being made in a field and in order to enable comparisons and controversial discussions 
between different lines of research that are based on the same or similar presuppositions.  
For example, the major schools of thought developed in “personality” psychology 
each comprise coherent sets of statements, theories and methods but still tend to be 
contradictory or even irreconcilable with one another because they are based on different 
absolute presuppositions (Fahrenberg 2013; Walach 2013). Specifically, biological, 
psychodynamic-motivational, behavioural-learning, social-cognitive and humanistic research 
traditions in psychology are each based on different absolute presuppositions about human 
nature, amongst others. In view of their increasing integration as “interconnected levels” into 
overarching “personality systems” (e.g., Mischel et al. 2007), one must ask which particular 
philosophical presuppositions will allow researchers to resolve the contradictions between 
these very different scientific systems? In what ways can “personality systems” comprising 
contradictory absolute presuppositions and thus different or even opposing metatheories and 
methodologies provide “a much more coherent view of the whole functioning individual in the 
social world” (Mischel et al. 2007)? Or rather, are such “integrative systems” not merely 
providing important overviews of the essential plurality of research perspectives and 
methodologies that are required to comprehensively explore individuals (see below; cf. 
Fahrenberg 2008, 2013; Uher 2014a; Wong 2009; Wundt 1894, 1920, 1921)? 
The TPS-Paradigm explicitly considers the additional intricacies with which 
researchers of individuals and of “personality” are confronted because the researchers 
themselves are always individuals with their own particular viewpoints, abilities and 
“personality” and thus, not independent from their particular objects of research. “Objectivity” 
can therefore be only intersubjectivity that can be reached only on the basis of shared 
                                               
2
 To appear in the Annals of Theoretical Psychology, vols. 12, 13. 
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philosophical presuppositions. This non-independence from the objects of research and the 
fact that it is the researchers’ abilities through which all science is made entail considerable 
risks for anthropo-, ethno- and ego-centric biases as well as for various fallacies of the 
human mind, such as those that cause researchers to oversimplify complexity (Royce 1891) 
and to reify linguistic abstractions (Whitehead 1929). Biases and fallacies can occur in 
researchers’ metatheories—in their basic assumptions about how to demarcate scientific 
phenomena, what to consider to be facts and how the thus-defined facts can be theoretically 
analysed and in researchers’ implicit and explicit beliefs and theoretical ideas about their 
objects of research and the questions that they ask about these objects. Biases and fallacies 
can also occur in researchers’ methodologies—in the ways (i.e., approaches) in which they 
tackle these questions and in the techniques (i.e., methods) that they use to do so (for 
details see Uher 2014a, b in this trilogy).  
The following outlines the absolute presuppositions that the TPS-Paradigm makes 
about research on individuals and presents basic metatheories and methodologies that are 
derived from these presuppositions and that are relevant for the analyses presented in this 
article. These elaborations are made to enable comparisons and controversial discussions 
with other lines of research in the field that are based on the same or similar presuppositions 
(Uher 2013, Desideratum 1g). Researchers making other absolute presuppositions must 
develop and use metatheories and methodologies other than the ones that are analysed in 
this trilogy, thus precluding direct comparisons. 
Presuppositions made about individuals as living organisms  
The TPS-Paradigm considers that individuals are living organisms. Living organisms 
can be conceived of as systems composed of sets of interrelated elements (von Bertalanffy 
1973) that are compounded into new elements at the next higher level of organisation (e.g., 
atoms, cells, organs, individuals; Caprara 1996). At each level of the systemic structure, 
compositional elements function together as a whole. This whole has different properties and 
functionings than the elements of which it is composed (principle of emergence). Therefore, 
identifying lower-level compositional structures cannot reveal the processes that govern how 
the compositional elements function and develop together as a whole at each particular level 
of organisation (e.g., Hartmann 1964; Rothschuh 1963; von Bertalanffy 1937; Wundt 1863). 
Assumptions of isomorphisms between elements on different levels (in all directions) can 
therefore be misleading, especially when phenomena of different kind are involved (see 
below; Bohr 1937; Koffka 1935; Köhler 1969; Mayr 1988). 
Given this, interrelations between elements can be conceived of as causal 
connections (Kausalzusammenhänge) only in some cases. Rather, compositional 
connections (Gefügezusammenhänge; Rothschuh 1963) must be conceived in which the 
elements co-occur in coordinated ways and match and interact with one another such that 
the entirety of their joint interactions results in complexes of higher organisation and that the 
presence or absence of single elements or single interrelations can fundamentally change 
their overall interactions (e.g., the various enzymes and pH-values that are involved in the 
metabolic processes in the mouth, stomach and intestines and that co-occur in a fine-tuned 
spatial and temporal proximity and in a specific order; Rothschuh 1963). Moreover, in 
different systemic contexts, different properties and functionalities can emerge from the 
same set of elements (multi-contextuality; Bronfenbrenner 1979; Lewin 1936). Metabolic 
enzymes that are active in the stomach cannot unfold the same properties and functionalities 
in the intestines.  
As living organisms, individuals can be conceived of as self-organising systems. 
Therefore, individuals and their various internal (e.g., physiological) subsystems are self-
referential to a considerable extent (Fahrenberg 2013; Luisi 2003; Varela, Maturana, & Uribe 
1974; Maturana 1975). In their processes of self-organisation, interactions between 
elements can result in lasting changes of the interacting elements in and of themselves as 
well as of their interrelations (i.e., dialectical processes; Rychlak 1968; Sameroff 2010). In 
addition, individuals can also be conceived of as open (i.e., dissipative) systems that 
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exchange with their surroundings and that develop non-linear system dynamics. Each event 
can be dynamically interrelated to and co-determined by all concurrent events internal and 
external to the individual as well as by past events within the same individual (cf. Lewin 
1935; Pauli 1927). The organisms’ future development therefore cannot be predicted with 
certainty and in their microgenetic, ontogenetic and phylogenetic development, irreversible 
processes may emerge that may be historically unique and never repeatable (Baldwin 1896; 
Caprara 1996; Li 2003; Prigogine 1996; Valsiner 2000).   
These philosophical and metatheoretical considerations of living organisms illuminate 
that structural approaches and process approaches in “personality” research take different 
perspectives on individuals. As science seeks to make abstractions from unique events to 
identify regularities and structures that may allow generalisations to be made at least to 
some extent, the TPS-Paradigm refers to these different perspectives more precisely as 
explorations of compositional structures and explorations of process structures (see part III 
below; Uher 2011a). This differentiation of structures of different kind is elementary for 
research on “personality” because the identification of what is specific to a particular 
individual presupposes explorations of the ways in which individuals differ from one another 
(Uher 2013). But explorations of differences between individuals are not suited to explore the 
functioning of a particular individual given that individuals, as living organisms, are inherently 
self-organising and therefore self-referential to a considerable extent. Thus, methodologies 
applied to study between-individual differences and methodologies applied to study within-
individual processes reveal different and apparently unrelated kinds of information about 
individuals. But these different kinds of information are both important for exploring 
“personality” and may thus be conceived of as complementary to one another. 
The epistemological principle of complementarity 
Bohr (1937) introduced the principle of complementarity in quantum physics as a 
solution for the wave-particle dilemma in research on the nature of light. He pointed out that, 
by using different methods, apparently incompatible kinds of information can be obtained 
about the properties of the same physical object. These different properties seem to be 
maximally incompatible with one another but are both equally essential for an exhaustive 
account of the results obtained, and may therefore be regarded as complementary to one 
another. Given this, the Bohrian principle of complementarity rejects methodological 
compromises while implying no limitations to the application of particular methods to 
describe and explore particular objects of research. Instead, the principle argues for 
analysing the presuppositions and the appropriateness of the conceptual structures involved, 
and for conceiving for the different properties under study different frames of reference that 
are categorically different, self-contained, mutually complementary and that are all essential 
for exploring the particular object of research.  
Bohr (1937) explicitly stated that this principle of complementarity could prove to be 
an epistemological principle that is also helpful in the life sciences where many phenomena 
exhibiting pairs of complementary properties are being explored, in particular in biology and 
psychology, such as the psyche-physicality problem (i.e., body-mind problem) in which this 
principle adopts a metaphysically neutral position without presuppositions of either monism 
or dualism (cf., Fahrenberg 1979, 1992, 2013; Hoche 2008; Kant 1798; Walach 2013; Wundt 
1894).  
The TPS-Paradigm adopts the presuppositions of this epistemological principle and 
applies them to fundamental questions in research on individuals and on “personality” (for 
details, see Uher 2014a in this trilogy). These absolute presuppositions are applied in this 
article (in part II) to explore the different perspectives that researchers take on “personality” 
when interpreting between-individual and within-individual structures. Thereafter, these 
absolute presuppositions are applied (in part III) to derive specific implications for the 
targeted and complementary application of between-individual and within-individual 
methodologies for enabling comprehensive taxonomic explorations of individuals’ 
“personality”.  
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The TPS-Paradigm’s elementary system of three metatheoretical properties  
The absolute presuppositions of epistemological complementarity are fundamental to 
the TPS-Paradigm. Specifically, it emphasises the necessity of considering—both 
theoretically and methodologically—the metatheoretical properties that can be conceived for 
the various kinds of phenomena explored in individuals. The particular presuppositions that it 
makes about phenomena and their properties are specified in the elementary system that 
constitutes an essential core component of this paradigm. 
As all science is made by human individuals, the TPS-Paradigm conceives of 
anything that is perceivable or conceivable by humans as a phenomenon; this terminology 
differs from various historical traditions of thought (e.g., Kant 1781; see Uher 2014a in this 
trilogy). Various kinds of phenomena (i.e., morphology, physiology, behaviours, the psyche, 
semiotic representations, artificially modified outer appearances and contexts; for their 
specification, see below) are differentiated from one another on the basis of three 
metatheoretical properties that can be conceived for these phenomena: 1) their spatial 
location in relation to the material entity of the individual, 2) temporal extension and 3) 
physicality versus “non-physicality”. The TPS-Paradigm considers these particular 
metatheoretical properties because the particular constellation of the forms that can be 
conceived for each given kind of phenomenon unequivocally determines its accessibility by 
individuals and thus also by researchers. Consequently, these properties also determine the 
accessibility of many further properties that can be perceived in the phenomena under study 
or can be inferred from them and that are mostly in the focus of research.  
In the TPS-Paradigm, the spatial and temporal dimensions of the phenomena under 
study are considered in the dimensions of everyday life experiences (i.e., spatial dimensions 
comparable to the human bodies, temporal dimensions of the international time standard) 
rather than in the dimensions of atoms or the outer space as considered in specific fields of 
research (e.g., chemistry, quantum physics, astronomy). But regardless of this, these 
metatheoretical properties are conceptualised on higher levels of abstraction than commonly 
considered in research on individuals and in everyday life. 
Metatheoretical Property 1: Spatial location in relation to the material physical 
entity of the individual   
The TPS-Paradigm conceives of internality and/or externality in fundamentally 
different ways than most previous lines of research on individuals. First, with regard to this 
property, individuals are conceived of as material physical entities that can be directly 
perceived in everyday life, rather than as subjectively, psychologically and/or socially 
constructed entities. Second, externality and/or internality refers to the particular 
phenomenon under study (e.g., behaviour) and its spatial location in relation to the material 
entity of the individual under study because this location determines the phenomenon’s 
direct perceptibility by individuals in everyday life and thus also in research settings. 
Phenomena that are external to others’ bodies (e.g., faces, clothes, trees) can be directly 
perceived, but this is not possible for phenomena that are located internal to other (healthy 
and intact) individuals’ bodies (e.g., brain, joints; only a few can be directly perceived under 
particular conditions, e.g., teeth and gums). Internal phenomena can be made perceptible by 
using invasive and technical methods (e.g., surgery, MRI), but only if these phenomena are 
physical (see below). Thus, in contrast with previous concepts, the TPS-Paradigm refers 
externality and/or internality neither to a particular theoretical focus that researchers can take 
on individuals nor to the perspectives that individuals can generally take on themselves and 
on others (for details, see Uher 2014a in this trilogy).  
Metatheoretical Property 2: Temporal extension   
Perceptibility of a phenomenon also requires its presence in the given moments of 
investigation. Some phenomena are temporally extended (e.g., individuals’ physiognomy, 
monuments). Other phenomena, by contrast, are ephemeral; their occurrence is strictly 
bound to the present moment in time (e.g., heart beats, gestures). Some momentary 
phenomena are also highly fluctuating. 
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Metatheoretical Property 3: Physicality versus “non-physicality”   
In the TPS-Paradigm, the terms physicality and physical refer to the science of 
physics rather than to corporality, which cannot be conceived for immaterial physical 
phenomena in and of themselves. Physicality denotes that, in material physical phenomena, 
there are spatial units that are rather constant and identically repeatable to a considerable 
extent (e.g., molecules, cells, body parts, houses). Spatial units occurring in the material 
physical phenomena can be used to identify units in immaterial physical phenomena that do 
not feature spatial units in and of themselves (e.g., heat, behaviours) but that are 
systematically related to material physical phenomena (e.g., the individual’s body). “Non-
physicality” 3, by contrast, denotes the immaterial properties of the phenomena of the psyche 
that, in and of themselves, lack not only spatial units (Kant 1798) but also systematic 
relations to the physical phenomena by which they are accompanied (e.g., brain physiology; 
Fahrenberg 2008, 2013; Wundt 1894).  
The various kinds of phenomena differentiated from one another on the basis of the 
three metatheoretical properties  
On the basis of this elementary system of these three metatheoretical properties, the 
TPS-Paradigm differentiates from one another various kinds of phenomena explored in 
individuals. These differentiations are made on the basis of the specific and different 
constellations of the forms with regard to these metatheoretical properties that can be 
conceived for each given kind of phenomenon. These particular constellations establish 
each phenomenon’s particular frame of reference that is applicable to the other kinds of 
phenomena only to some degree or not at all. Insufficient consideration of these frames of 
reference may therefore entail mismatches with the methodologies used for explorations (cf. 
phenomenon-methodology matching below and in Uher 2014a, b in this trilogy; cf. Uher 
2013, Desiderata 1a, 1e, 1f). 
Between all kinds of phenomena differentiated, the TPS-Paradigm distinguishes 
basic kinds from composite kinds of phenomena. The basic kinds of phenomena comprise 
the phenomena of morphology, physiology, behaviour and the psyche because they are 
physically inseparable from the material entity (i.e., the body) of the healthy and fully intact 
individual. Separations can be made only conceptually as done in the TPS-Paradigm by 
conceiving and differentiating these kinds of phenomena on metatheoretical levels. 
Composite kinds of phenomena each comprise several different kinds of phenomena, 
among them at least one basic kind of phenomenon, which is thus inseparable (in the sense 
stated) from the body of the individual studied. Composite kinds of phenomena may also 
comprise external physical phenomena that are independent from the studied individual’s 
body. This entails that composite kinds of phenomena are more heterogeneous than each of 
the basic kinds of phenomena in and of themselves. Of composite kind are the phenomena 
of semiotic representations, artificially modified outer appearance and contexts. How are 
these different kinds of phenomena defined and metatheoretically conceived? 
Morphology4 refers to living organisms’ bodily structures and their constituting parts. 
Morphological phenomena can be located internal (e.g., inner organs) or external (e.g., 
physique) to the studied individual’s body; some can also be both (e.g., hair, outer skin). 
These phenomena are temporally extended, thus not bound to the immediate moment, and 
they are material physical (e.g., tissue).  
Physiology refers to the phenomena of the chemical and physical functioning of 
morphological phenomena. They are located primarily internal to the studied individual’s 
body (e.g., endocrine hormones), but some can also become external (e.g., breath). Many 
physiological phenomena are not strictly momentary (e.g., blood fat levels), but some are 
                                               
3
 The term “non-physical” is put in quotation marks in the TPS-Paradigm because it denotes 
properties that are not simply contrasted against the physical but are complementary instead (see 
Uher 2014a). 
4
 The terms morphology and physiology denote the organismal structures and functions, in and of 
themselves, rather than the scientific disciplines that explore these kinds of phenomena. 
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(e.g., action potentials of nerve cells). All physiological phenomena are physical, though not 
necessarily material in and of themselves (e.g., heat).  
Behaviours are defined in the TPS-Paradigm as the “external changes or activities of 
living organisms that are functionally mediated5 by other external phenomena (Millikan 1993) 
in the present moment” (Uher 2013; Uher et al. 2013a, Uher et al. 2013b). Functional 
external changes or activities are behaviours only if their functions have reference to other 
external phenomena or to relations to them. Thus, not all of the individual’s external changes 
or activities are behaviours (e.g., mere chemical by-products such as heat) and vice versa, 
behaviours are not just movements (e.g., freezing behaviour in prey animals; Millikan 1993). 
Importantly, neither physiological responses nor mental activities are conceived of as 
behaviours; this differs fundamentally from some concepts of behaviourist paradigms. Also, 
the TPS-Paradigm makes no a priori assumptions about the potential causes of behaviours 
in other kinds of phenomena as implied by concepts of “goal-directed” actions or behavioural 
“responses” of some cognitivist paradigms. Rather, in line with the epistemological principle 
of complementarity, it considers that, for other phenomena, different metatheoretical 
properties can be conceived that require different methodologies for explorations and thus 
also for explorations of their interrelations with behaviours. Hence, behavioural phenomena 
are located entirely external to the studied individual’s body. Behaviours are momentary and 
fluctuating; their temporal extensions are often only low. Behaviours are immaterial physical 
phenomena in and of themselves (e.g., acoustic waves) but bound to the physical matter of 
individuals’ bodies and of their external physical surroundings.  
The psyche denotes the entirety of the phenomena of the immediate experiential 
reality both conscious and non-conscious of living organisms (cf. Wundt 1896). The TPS-
Paradigm refers to these phenomena as psychical rather than psychological because 
“events, processes and structures that are properly called psychical do not become 
psychological until they have been operated upon in some way by the science of 
psychology” (Adams & Zener in Lewin 1935, p. vii). Importantly, the term psychical denotes 
not only mental but also emotional, volitional and other kinds of psychical phenomena that 
are always part of individuals’ immediate experiential reality as well (Wundt 1896). The TPS-
Paradigm also considers that not all psychical phenomena can be consciously perceived 
and easily verbalised but nevertheless form important parts of individuals’ immediate 
experiential reality (Freud 1915; Kant 1798; Kelly 1955).  
Psychical phenomena are located entirely internal to individuals’ bodies. But in 
contrast to internal physical phenomena (e.g. brain morphology and physiology), psychical 
phenomena are accessible only by the individual him- or herself and by nobody else (Kant 
1786; Locke 1689). The TPS-Paradigm conceives of psychical phenomena as “non-
physical”; thus as immaterial and lacking spatial units or spatial dimensions in and of 
themselves (Kant 1798). Hence, the entirety of psychical phenomena cannot be conceived 
of as a spatial entity that could be directly perceived as is possible for the individual’s body; 
notions of “the psyche” in the TPS-Paradigm therefore do not and cannot imply reification as 
a concrete entity. The psyche can only be conceived of as an entity, thus as a constructed 
entity. “Non-physicality” also denotes that psychical phenomena are lacking systematic 
relations to the material and immaterial physical phenomena by which are accompanied 
(e.g., brain morphology and physiology; Fahrenberg 2008, 2013; Wundt 1896).  
On a metatheoretical level, the TPS-Paradigm differentiates experiencings from 
experiences on the basis of their temporal extension. Experiencings are strictly bound to the 
immediate moment and highly fluctuating (Kant 1798; Pauli 1927; Stern 1924; Uher 2013; 
Valsiner 1998; Wundt 1920). Experiences are the a posteriori of experiencings; they are 
memorised psychical resultants that are retained from past experiencings in processed and 
abstracted forms and are therefore temporally more extended. The TPS-Paradigm 
differentiates two kinds of memorised psychical resultants in line with the presuppositions 
that it makes about individuals as living organisms. Specifically, it conceives of compositional 
                                               
5
 The meaning of the term mediation in the TPS-Paradigm refers to the Latin mediare, to be in the 
middle, not to the meaning established in statistics (where it is differentiated from moderation).   
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structures that are perceived by individuals as the contents of their experiential reality (e.g., 
perceptual representations, self-concepts, beliefs, ideas, knowledge) and of process 
structures that refer to basic patterns in the processing of these contents (e.g., abilities for 
abstraction and construction, attention and memory span, volition, self-organisation). 
Memorised psychical resultants of both kind cannot be accessed directly but can only be 
reconstructed and executed in an individual’s ongoing experiencings. Memorised psychical 
resultants are thus never merely identically repeated but always reconstructed and 
processed anew in the particular context of their re-activation (Bartlett 1932; Schacter & 
Addis 2007) before they are reintegrated again into the hitherto reached compositional and 
process structures of the individual’s psychical system that thereby continuously changes 
and develops (cf. irreversible processes of development; Le Poidevin 2011; Valsiner 2012).  
Semiotic representations are conceived of in the TPS-Paradigm as composite kinds 
of phenomena comprising psychical phenomena (e.g., experiencings, memorised psychical 
resultants) that are tightly intertwined with particular external physical phenomena (e.g., 
behaviours, paper, ink). As psychical phenomena in and of themselves are imperceptible by 
others, individuals use these external physical phenomena—because these are perceptible 
by others—to convey (i.e., externalise) the meanings that they construct for their own 
psychical phenomena such that other individuals can make adequate inferences about these 
psychical phenomena (Uher 2014d). Meanings of vital importance are externalised in 
species-specific behaviours in rather fixed ways. In addition, meanings can also be assigned 
to particular external physical phenomena in arbitrary (and therefore regionally varying) 
ways. If multiple individuals psychically represent such assignments in socially shared ways, 
the particular external physical events become signs. Signs may be either bound to 
individuals’ bodies (i.e., behavioural signs, such as spoken language) or be independent of 
them (i.e., material signs, such as written language).  
Importantly, although many material signs (e.g., texts, monuments) are independent 
of individuals’ bodies, signs cannot be understood without the particular psychical 
phenomena (e.g., meanings) with which they are tightly intertwined and that first turn these 
physical phenomena into signs. This is because meanings are not inherent to the particular 
physical phenomena (e.g., vocalisations, stones) that are used as signs; rather, meanings 
are only assigned to them by particular communities. Dualistic concepts in which signs (e.g., 
“cultural practices”) are explored separately from the individuals who develop and use these 
signs, such as for exploring the influence of culture on individuals’ “personality”, therefore 
inherently entail circularity in exploration. The TPS-Paradigm rejects dualistic concepts and 
conceives of semiotic representations as composite kinds of phenomena in which the 
physical phenomena that they comprise cannot be understood as signs (e.g., “cultural 
artefacts”) if the psychical phenomena with which they are tightly intertwined are excluded 
from the considerations made. Exclusive conceptual separations are not possible—unless 
the physical phenomena are considered only as such (e.g., sounds, stones) rather than as 
signs (e.g., spoken language, hieroglyphs). Instead, the different kinds of phenomena that 
are comprised by semiotic representations can be conceptually separated from one 
another—and thus from the individuals studied—only inclusively (cf. Valsiner 1987). This can 
be done on the basis of the forms that they take with regard to the three metatheoretical 
properties that the TPS-Paradigm considers. These differences in metatheoretical properties 
entail that isomorphisms between the different kinds of phenomena that are comprised by 
semiotic representations can be only low. Thus, semiotic representations are phenomena of 
heterogeneous metatheoretical properties and their internal structures are more complex 
than those of any of the basic kinds of phenomena. 
Artificially modified outer appearances are conceived of in the TPS-Paradigm as both 
the parts of individuals’ natural outer morphology that they can change and modify on an 
individual level (e.g., hairstyle, tattoos) and the physical objects that individuals attach to 
their bodies (e.g., clothing, accessories). Artificial outer-appearance modifications are 
located external to individuals’ bodies and are primarily material physical. They are 
temporally more extended than behaviours but less extended than individuals’ natural outer 
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morphology. These physical modifications are often used to represent and convey particular 
meanings to other individuals (e.g., community membership). Therefore, the TPS-Paradigm 
conceives of and explores these phenomena as special kinds of semiotic representations 
that are characterised by their physical attachment to individuals’ bodies. 
Contexts are commonly conceived of as “environments” that are external to and 
separate from the studied individuals. Researchers develop such dualistic concepts often 
with the aim of answering the fundamental question of whether individuals are influenced 
more by their external surroundings (e.g., situations) or their internal properties (cf. the 
person-situation controversy). But the same external physical events are not the same for all 
individuals; rather, individuals interact with only those events that are relevant for them given 
their particular physical and psychical properties (Lewin 1936; Nagel 1974; Rotter 1954; von 
Uexküll 1909). Thus, the external physical events constituting an individual’s context cannot 
be identified independently from the individual being studied (Lewin 1936). Moreover, 
individuals are influenced not only by external events but also by internal events, and these 
are not only psychical but also physical (e.g., nutritional status). It follows that contextual 
phenomena cannot be conceived if the individuals studied are excluded from the 
considerations; thus exclusive conceptual separations are not possible. Therefore, dualistic 
concepts of context inherently entail circularity in exploration (see below, parts II and III). 
Therefore, and given the philosophical presuppositions made about individuals as 
living organisms (cf. multi-contextuality), the TPS-Paradigm rejects dualistic conceptions of 
contextual phenomena and conceives of contexts as composite kinds of phenomena that 
comprise several different kinds of phenomena. Among them—and often in the focus of 
contextual explorations—is at least one basic kind of phenomenon (i.e., morphological, 
physiological, behavioural or psychical), which is thus physically inseparable from the 
studied individual’s body. In addition, a given contextual phenomenon may comprise further 
basic kinds of phenomena and/or external phenomena that are independent from the 
material entity of the studied individual’s body (e.g., other humans, buildings). Hence, 
contextual phenomena may comprise both internal and external phenomena, both 
momentary and non-momentary phenomena, and both “non-physical” and physical 
phenomena; thus, their metatheoretical properties are heterogeneous. This composite 
conception implies that the different kinds of phenomena that are comprised by contextual 
phenomena can be conceptually separated from one another—and thus from the individuals 
under study—only inclusively (cf. Valsiner 1987). This can be done on the basis of the 
different forms that they take with regard to the three metatheoretical properties considered 
in the TPS-Paradigm. These differences entail that isomorphisms between the different 
kinds of phenomena comprised can be only low, making the structures of contextual 
phenomena more complex than the structures of any of the basic kinds of phenomena. 
(Concepts of situations, behavioural situations and culture are defined and explored in Uher 
2014a in this trilogy). 
Methodological implications derived from the three metatheoretical properties for the 
elementary problem of phenomenon-methodology matching 
The TPS-Paradigm derives various methodological implications from the 
philosophical presuppositions that it makes about research on individuals. Central is the 
elaboration of the philosophy-of-science foundations underlying the elementary problem of 
phenomenon-methodology matching in order to derive clear-cut criteria that researchers can 
use to decide which particular methodologies allow for exploring a particular phenomenon 
and which ones do not (Uher 2013, Desiderata 1d-f). Such criteria specifying the particular 
conditions under which a given methodology can be considered to be “appropriate” for 
exploring a particular phenomenon (as is often voiced) have been missing so far, despite 
intense debates about this matching problem (cf. the controversy on quantitative versus 
qualitative methodologies in psychology explored in 2014a in this trilogy and the controversy 
on nomothetic-ideographic approaches, explored in part III below). Previous research 
focused primarily on the inferences that can be made about the phenomena under study 
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given that the empirical structures that can be obtained from them do or do not match 
particular mathematical properties or statistical theories as demonstrated for “psychometric” 
methods, amongst others, in Uher (2014b) in this trilogy.  
By contrast, the TPS-Paradigm first specifies, on the basis of the philosophical 
presuppositions that it makes, particular metatheoretical properties that can be conceived for 
the phenomena under study. Specifically, it considers three metatheoretical properties that 
generally determine the perceptibility of a given phenomenon by individuals in everyday life 
and thus, also the possibilities and means for establishing the given phenomenon’s 
perceptibility in research settings (e.g., by using invasive or technical methods). These three 
metatheoretical properties are conceived on levels of abstraction that are commonly not 
considered, likely because these properties do not appear to be of primary concern for the 
research questions pursued in the field, which are commonly far more specific. From these 
metatheoretical concepts, the TPS-Paradigm derives specific principles for the targeted 
development of methodologies. Thus, it explores the elementary problem of phenomenon-
methodology matching on the basis of only three abstract properties that generally 
determine the phenomena’s accessibility for researchers—and, as a consequence of this, 
also the accessibility of many further properties that can be perceived in the phenomena 
under study or can be inferred from them and that are mostly in the focus of research, such 
as within- and between-individual variations and structures, functional interrelations between 
events, or processes of change and development. Hence, in this stage of the research 
process, the TPS-Paradigm considers neither mathematics nor statistics nor any properties 
of the phenomena under study other than the three metatheoretical ones referring to their 
temporal and spatial extension.  
Nunc-ipsum methods, extroquestive and introquestive methods  
The phenomena’s temporal properties are used to derive and define a first category 
of methods. Specifically, momentary phenomena can be perceived by individuals and thus 
can be accessed by researchers only in the particular moments in which their events occur 
(e.g., vocalisations, heart beats). The brief temporal extension of phenomena under study 
requires methods that allow for the real-time recording of momentary events; the TPS-
Paradigm refers to such methods as nunc-ipsum methods (from Latin nunc ipsum for at this 
very instant). This criterion is fulfilled in diverse methods that each target at a specific kind of 
phenomenon (e.g., behaviour, physiology) and that often involve technical means to facilitate 
the recording of momentary events (e.g., voice recorder; electrocardiograph, ECG).  
The phenomena’s spatial properties (i.e., spatial location in relation to the individuals’ 
body and physicality versus “non-physicality”) are used to derive and define two further 
categories of methods. Extroquestive methods (from the Latin extro for beyond, outside) are 
defined as all procedures for studying phenomena that individuals can directly perceive as 
being located external to their bodies and that can therefore be directly perceived by multiple 
individuals—thus, only physical phenomena. Using the same extroquestive ways of 
exploration, individuals can also directly perceive many physical phenomena of their own 
bodies both external (e.g., feet) and, under special conditions (e.g., injuries), even internal 
(e.g., blood). The central point is that physical phenomena of individuals’ bodies are directly 
perceptible or can be made directly perceptible by other individuals as well, both external 
ones and, under particular conditions, also internal physical phenomena (e.g., coronary 
arteries by using invasive and technical methods such as open heart surgery or cardiac 
catheterisation).  
Introquestive methods (from the Latin intro for in, within), by contrast, are defined as 
all procedures for studying phenomena that can be directly perceived only from within the 
individual him- or herself and that are, in principle, not directly perceptible by any other 
individual under all possible conditions—thus, only psychical phenomena. Psychical 
phenomena (e.g., thoughts) cannot be directly perceived by any other individual (Kant 1786; 
Locke 1689; Uher 2013, 2014d); they remain generally inaccessible by extroquestive 
methods, no matter what invasive or technically advanced methods may be used. This 
entails intricate challenges as the researchers themselves cannot directly perceive the 
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phenomena under study but have to rely on the studied individuals’ externalisations, 
especially self-reports. Therefore, the TPS-Paradigm refers to all (guided and non-guided) 
methods of self-observation and self-report as introquestive methods (e.g., self-report 
questionnaires). 
The ending (extro- and intro)–questive or –question (from the Latin quaerere for to 
seek, ask, enquire) implies that these methods involve all kinds of sensory perception (e.g., 
visual, acoustic, haptic) as well as some active exploration on the part of the individuals who 
perceive the phenomena under study. The TPS-Paradigm introduces these terms to denote 
the particular kinds of methods that are derived from the three metatheoretical properties 
that it considers. These terms are also introduced to differentiate these specific methods 
from various concepts of introspection and extrospection, which are commonly defined and 
differentiated from one another by focussing on the individual under study (cf., Boring 1953; 
Butler 2013; James 1890; Locke 1689). But individuals can always perceive and conceive of 
both external phenomena and their own psychical phenomena; thus they can introspect and 
extrospect at the same time. Both perspectives are always interwoven in individuals’ 
immediate experiential reality—and this applies to both the individuals studied and the 
researchers studying them (cf. Kant 1781; Wundt 1896). Thus, as methods, introspection 
and extrospection cannot be clearly differentiated from one another.  
The TPS-Paradigm, by contrast, defines introquestive and extroquestive methods 
and differentiates them from one another on the basis of a) the particular phenomena under 
study, considering that various other phenomena are likely present in the given investigation 
as well and that all individuals involved can introspect and extrospect at the same time, and 
of b) the particular persons who perceive the phenomena under study and who provide first 
representations of information from their perceptions and conceptions of the phenomena 
under study in particular external physical phenomena that are used as signs (e.g., written 
numerals, spoken words).  
Metatheoretical and consent-based commensurability and basic conversion 
principles  
When information is carried over from a particular kind of phenomenon to another 
kind of phenomenon, this is referred to as conversion in the TPS-Paradigm. Conversions of 
information from psychical phenomena (e.g., perceptions, thoughts), which are imperceptible 
by other individuals in principle, into external physical phenomena that others can perceive 
and that are often used as signs (e.g., behaviours, materials like paper, computers), are 
essential components of every human communication (for details, see Uher 2014d). The 
conversion of information between different kinds of phenomena is also one of the most 
elementary processes of data generation in all sciences, in natural and human sciences 
alike (cf. Wundt 1896). In research on individuals, such conversions of information are 
particularly important because it is primarily the signs (e.g., lexically encoded variables, 
numerals) that are considered to be “data” and that are analysed in scientific explorations 
(e.g., using content analyses, statistical analyses) in lieu of the actual phenomena under 
study (e.g., behaviours, morphology). The phenomena under study in and of themselves are 
seldom explored directly (i.e., manipulated) as is the case when, for example, bodily tissue is 
dissected and dyed (i.e., analysed). Consequently, the methodologies used to generate 
“data” unequivocally determine whether or not a particular kind of phenomenon can be 
appropriately represented in these “data”, thus enabling its scientific exploration (for details, 
see Uher 2014a, b in this trilogy).  
The TPS-Paradigm explores such conversions of information on the basis of the 
three metatheoretical properties that it considers and of properties that are intersubjectively 
ascribed to the signs used (e.g., mathematical properties) and that are related to at least one 
of these three metatheoretical properties (e.g., numerals representing distinct events or 
frequencies of events of the same kind). Specifically, the particular constellation of forms 
with regard to all three metatheoretical properties that can be conceived for a given kind of 
phenomenon establishes its frame of reference. If the same constellation can be conceived 
for different kinds of phenomena, isomorphisms between their events can be high. Their 
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frames of reference are then considered to be completely metatheoretically commensurable 
(from the Latin commensurabilis for having a common measure). Complete metatheoretical 
commensurability enables appropriate conversions of information between phenomena of 
different kind, such as between the phenomena under study and the physical phenomena 
that used as signs in the process of data generation.  
By contrast, conversions of information between kinds of phenomena for which 
different frames of reference can be conceived inevitably entail a loss of information 
(therefore, the term conversion rather than translation or transcription is used). Significant 
loss of relevant information, which may be neither obvious nor known a priori, entails that the 
frame of reference of a particular semiotic system cannot be used to appropriately represent 
information from the phenomena under study, thus hindering their scientific exploration. This 
constitutes the elementary problem of phenomenon-methodology matching (examples of 
such mismatches in taxonomic “personality” research are explored in part II below and in 
Uher 2014b in this trilogy).  
The TPS-Paradigm specifies basic conversion principles that are relevant for 
conversions of information between kinds of phenomena that differ from one another with 
regard to one or even all of the three metatheoretical properties considered. Conversion 
Principle 1 states that differences in the phenomena’s internality versus externality to the 
individual’s body may constrain conversions of information if, through these conversions, the 
phenomena under study are altered in and of themselves. This it is a fundamental problem 
for explorations of psychical phenomena and may also affect explorations of individuals’ 
inner morphology and physiology as explored below. Conversion Principle 2 denotes that 
constraints for conversions of information may arise if one or all of the phenomena that are 
involved are momentary and, in particular, if one or even both of them feature units of 
varying temporal extension that are therefore identically repeatable only to some extent. 
Conversion Principle 3 denotes that differences in the phenomena’s physical properties may 
constrain conversions of information between them if one or even both of the phenomena 
that are involved feature units of varying spatial extension that are thus identically repeatable 
only to some extent or if spatial units cannot be conceived at all. Conversion principles 2 and 
3 entail challenges in particular for behavioural and psychological research as explored 
below (for details, see also Uher 2014a in this trilogy)  
When, between the frames of reference of different kinds of phenomena, only partial 
or even no metatheoretical commensurability can be assumed, commensurability must be 
established on the basis of decisions. These decisions are made by the persons who 
provide the first conversions of information from their perceptions and conceptions of the 
phenomena under study in information in other kinds of phenomena that can be used as 
signs. When these decisions are made explicit and specified in intersubjective agreement, 
this is referred to as consent-based commensurability. Scientific exploration presupposes 
that information is converted systematically and according to explicitly defined assignment 
rules (i.e., coding schemes); this is referred to as encoding (also coding) in the TPS-
Paradigm as in many fields of research as well.  
Encoding schemes specify the particular intersubjective agreements that are made in 
a given study about which particular pieces of information about the phenomena and events 
under study as perceived and conceived by human individuals (e.g., researchers, observers) 
can be demarcated and categorised in what ways and how the thus defined units can be 
represented through which particular signs (e.g., behavioural variables, numerals). These 
issues of operational definition are well known and frequently discussed in all areas of 
research—much in contrast to the preceding metatheoretical and methodological steps of 
data generation, which should therefore not be confused with concepts of operationalism (as 
explained in Uher 2014a in this trilogy). The TPS-Paradigm extends the previous concepts of 
operational definition by emphasising that researchers must address in their encoding 
schemes the particular issues that it specifies in the basic conversion principles for each of 
the three metatheoretical properties. Explicit definitions and descriptions of the particular 
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phenomena and events under study are also prerequisite for scientific quantification (Uher 
2013, Desiderata 1d-f). 
Philosophy-of-science foundations for scientific quantification 
Many researchers exploring individuals aim to quantify their particular phenomena of 
interest. The appropriateness and meaningfulness of quantifications, in particular with regard 
to psychical phenomena (cf. phenomenon-methodology matching), are intensely debated 
(cf. the controversies on quantitative versus qualitative methodologies explored in 2014a in 
this trilogy and on nomothetic versus ideographic approaches, explored in part III below). But 
clear-cut criteria that researchers can use to decide whether or not particular kinds of 
phenomena can be quantified at all and what particular methods enable quantifications of 
which particular kinds of phenomena have been missing so far. In lack of such criteria, 
numerical data are frequently created somehow or other without specifying how these data 
are actually generated and what particular phenomena and events they can actually 
represent (as is the case e.g., in standardised questionnaire methods, see part II below and 
2014b in this trilogy). 
The set-theoretic and algebraic requirements of scientific quantification   
The TPS-Paradigm elaborates philosophy-of-science foundations for scientific 
quantification to provide such criteria. It identifies two elementary requirements on the basis 
of the three metatheoretical properties that it considers and of established concepts of set 
theory and algebra (JCGM 2008). First, researchers must specify the sets of the elements to 
be quantified in the phenomena under study (i.e., the set-theoretic requirement of scientific 
quantification). These sets of elements must be intersubjectively demarcated, categorised 
and lexically described in the explicit encoding schemes that researchers establish for their 
particular study. Second, researchers must directly compare the elements thus-defined with 
designated fixed physical standards of measurement to express their ratio as a real number 
(i.e., the algebraic requirement of scientific quantification).  
The TPS-Paradigm refers to the particular operations and practices that are used to 
actualise the conversion and the encoding decisions made in empirical studies as methods 
of data generation. Numerical data that fulfil the set-theoretic and algebraic requirements are 
referred to as scientific quantifications—as opposed to (subjective) quantification in which 
these requirements are not fulfilled (for examples, see Uher 2014b in this trilogy). 
Importantly, these two requirements must be fulfilled with regard to the phenomena under 
study, not only with regard to the phenomena used as signs given that their frames of 
reference may be metatheoretically commensurable only partially or not at all. This is not 
always well considered in research on individuals as the analyses presented in this trilogy 
show.  
Using temporal standards of measurement: The concept of time-relative 
probabilities   
Most frequently used in science are spatial standard units of measurement (e.g., of 
distance, such as meter). But in explorations of momentary and fluctuating phenomena, 
comparisons with spatial standards are often complicated. For scientifically quantifying 
momentary phenomena in which defined events cannot be directly compared with spatial 
standard units of measurement, such as because the single events vary considerably in their 
spatial extensions (i.e., behavioural phenomena) or because spatial extensions cannot be 
assumed at all (i.e., psychical phenomena), the TPS-Paradigm provides a concept in which 
time is used as the physical standard unit of measurement for enabling scientific 
quantifications. Specifically, nunc-ipsum methods are used to generate log files of the (non-
)occurrences of defined events (e.g., behaviours, externalisations of psychical phenomena) 
from which quantitative measurements are obtained by accumulating the registered events 
over repeated occasions. Given the phenomena’s momentariness and fluctuations, the 
measurements thus-obtained can be only probabilistic. These probabilistic measurements 
are then are related to the time periods during which they were recorded to obtain time-
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relative probabilities thus enabling scientific ratio-scaled quantifications (for details, see Uher 
2013, 2014a in this trilogy). 
Methodological implications for explorations and scientific quantifications of the 
various kinds of phenomena studied in individuals: Psychologists’ unparalleled 
scientific challenges  
The TPS-Paradigm emphasises that the researchers’ opportunities for developing 
methodologies that are matched to the phenomena under study and appropriate for their 
exploration and for meeting the set-theoretical and algebraic requirements of scientific 
quantification are unequivocally determined by the three metatheoretical properties that can 
be conceived for the each given kind of phenomenon. The following explicates the most 
important methodological implications that are relevant for exploring researchers’ theoretical 
interpretations of data, findings and previous taxonomic “personality” models regarding the 
phenomena that these represent. 
Material physical phenomena (e.g., individuals’ body tissue, written documents, 
interiors of an examination room) are extroquestively accessible, temporally extended and 
feature rather constant spatial units that are identically repeatable to a considerable extent 
(e.g., liver cells, printed pages, cupboards). This constellation of properties enables multiple 
individuals to perceive one and the same event. This, in turn, facilitates an intersubjective 
consent to be reached on how to demarcate and categorise in the phenomena under study 
the sets of elements to be quantified—as perceived and conceived by human individuals 
(e.g., different tissue cells conceived of as muscle cells, nerve cells, skin cells). These 
properties also help researchers to reach intersubjective agreement on explicit encoding 
schemes specifying how information from the thus-defined elements of the phenomena 
under study can be systematically converted into the physical phenomena used as signs 
(e.g., the words denoting “muscle cells”, “nerve cells”, “skin cells” in English or Latin or any 
other language). The semiotic systems that are used in science (e.g., lexically encoded 
variables, numerals) feature the same metatheoretical properties as the material physical 
phenomena under study (i.e., extroquestively accessible, material6 physical, temporally 
extended); therefore, their frames of reference show complete metatheoretical 
commensurability with one another, thus enabling appropriate conversions of information 
from the phenomena studied.  
Immaterial physical phenomena do not feature spatial units in and of themselves. In 
those immaterial physical phenomena that show systematic relations to the material 
phenomena to which they are bound (e.g., individuals’ physiology, electromagnetic radiation, 
gravity), the sets of elements to be quantified can be intersubjectively demarcated, 
categorised and defined on the basis of the rather constant spatial units of the material 
physical phenomena to which they are related (e.g., individuals’ morphology, an iron bar).  
These properties of both immaterial and material physical phenomena allow for the 
development of technical methods that automatically convert information from these 
phenomena into information in semiotic systems without relying on human individuals in this 
conversion process (e.g., an automated blood gas analyser identifies in blood samples 
acidity, oxygen and carbon dioxide tension, amongst other substances). 
Behavioural phenomena, by contrast, can seldom be explored using automated 
technologies (as possible e.g., for uniform behavioural movements such as lever presses 
recorded mechanically). Behavioural phenomena are extroquestively accessible, but they 
are strictly momentary, which complicates the joint perception of one and the same event by 
multiple individuals. Behaviours are immaterial physical phenomena and lack spatial units in 
and of themselves (e.g., sound waves), but units can be identified through the physical 
matter of the individual’s body (e.g., face, chest) and of his or her external surroundings to 
which they are interrelated (e.g., phonographs that mechanically inscribe sound waves onto 
                                               
6
 Digital data can be conceived as immaterial; however, as they can be perceived and used only 
through the material phenomena to which they are systematically related and bound (e.g., computer 
screen and other hardware), this specification is irrelevant for the issues explored here. 
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discs). But, unlike other immaterial physical phenomena, the units that can be identified in 
this way are identically repeatable only to some extent as their spatial and temporal 
extensions often vary. For example, individuals can shout in very different ways, such as at 
different pitch levels, in different volume and with variable intermissions, not to mention the 
different meanings that they can semiotically convey in their shouting. Given this, what entity 
can be demarcated and categorised as one (n  = 1) shout? Which particular entities can be 
considered to be of the same kind, thus as identically repeatable at least to some extent? 
Even if drawing breath is used to demarcate events of shouting from one another, can brief 
and long shouts, high-pitched and low-pitched shouts, and softer and louder shouts still be 
conceived as entities of the same kind? Given these metatheoretical properties of 
behaviours, there is considerable scope for making decisions about how to convert 
information from the events perceived into particular physical events of semiotic systems (cf. 
Uher 2011b). For this reason, behavioural scientists must largely rely on human individuals 
(e.g., observers) who directly perceive the phenomena and events under study and who 
provide the primary conversion of information from the phenomena under study into 
information in semiotic systems. Explicitly defined encoding schemes are therefore essential 
for achieving conversions of information that are—in the intersubjective perception and 
conception of multiple human individuals and their socially shared demarcation and lexical 
encoding—appropriate to represent relevant information from the behavioural phenomena 
under study (cf. Fassnacht 1982), thus for establishing consent-based commensurability. 
Psychical phenomena entail intricacies for scientific explorations that are unparalleled 
in the sciences (for details, see Uher 2014d). Psychical phenomena are entirely internal and 
accessible only to the individual him- or herself using introquestion, but imperceptible by 
other individuals in principle. Whereas the internal material and immaterial physical 
phenomena with which psychical phenomena are connected (e.g., tissue and electrical 
potentials of neurons) can be made perceptible for other individuals by using invasive and 
technical methods (e.g., MRI, EEG), this is not possible for psychical phenomena, which can 
be conceived only as “non-physical” and thus non-spatial. Given these properties, psychical 
phenomena do not offer any point of reference that the individual him- or herself could use to 
demarcate and categorise defined sets of elements. Psychical events can be demarcated 
only by mere thought, but the mentally demarcated elements cannot be kept isolated for 
enabling reliable and systematic categorisations (cf. Kant 1786).  
However, the specific formations that psychical events may take in any given 
individual are not important because individuals and their psychical systems, as living 
systems, are self-organising and thus self-referential to a considerable extent. What is 
important is their functionality—the meaning that they have for the given individual in his or 
her particular context. Demarcating and categorising these meanings is therefore solely a 
matter of subjective construction that researchers cannot easily reconstruct for several 
reasons. Specifically, researchers have to rely on the studied individuals’ externalisations 
(i.e., behaviours, behavioural and material signs) without knowing about how people—each 
one individually at each given moment—convert information from their internal psychical 
events into information in external physical ones. These primary conversions of information 
occur between phenomena with very different properties (internal “non-physical” versus 
external physical). Isomorphisms between their interrelated events can therefore only be low 
and their frames of reference can be metatheoretically commensurable only partially or not 
at all, thus precluding straightforward inferences from individuals’ externalisations to their 
psychical phenomena. This is a crucial point for the metatheories and methodologies that 
researchers use to define, generate and analyse data (explored in Uher 2014b in this trilogy) 
and for their interpretations of data and findings thus-obtained (explored in parts II and III 
below). Further complicating is the fact that adult human individuals primarily externalise 
their psychical events in language, thus using semiotic representations.  
Semiotic representations are important tools for researchers to reconstruct psychical 
phenomena because semiotic representations comprise assignments of particular meanings 
to particular behavioural or material signs that are socially shared, also by the researchers if 
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they are part of the same sociocultural community as the individuals under study (cf. 
Danziger 1997). However, semiotic systems contain implicit structures in both the external 
physical phenomena used as signs (e.g., phonetics) and their assignments to particular 
psychical phenomena (e.g., semantics). These implicit structures and meanings inevitably 
influence individuals’ psychical processes, and thus, also the structures of their memorised 
psychical resultants both compositional structures and process structures. Therefore, the 
signs (e.g., lexical terms) that individuals use for externalisations do not reflect the psychical 
events that they denote in the same ways in which individuals perceive these events at a 
given moment. Many psychical phenomena can generally not be easily verbalised and, 
moreover, individuals are consciously aware of only small subsets of their psychical 
processes (Brower 1949; Freud 1915; Kelly 1955; Komatsu 2012; Lahlou 1996; Larocco 
2014; Uher 2013, Uher et al. 2013b; Valsiner 2012; Vygotsky 1934; Westen 1996, 1999; 
Whorf 1958).  
Because researchers can perceive only the signs that individuals use to externalise 
their psychical events but not the psychical events in and of themselves, the implicit 
structures, meanings and variations that semiotic representations contain (e.g., language) 
can interfere twice or even three times in the research process. Inferences can occur 
(Conversion Step 1) in the primary conversion made by the individuals under study who 
externalise information from their psychical events, thus from the events under study; 
(Conversion Step 2) in the encoding schemes used by the researchers to convert 
information from the studied individuals’ externalisations into information in the signs that are 
used as variables and data; and (Conversion Step 3) in the researchers’ interpretations of 
the analytical results obtained from these data with regard to the psychical phenomena and 
events to be explored (see parts II and III below).  
To establish consent-based commensurability, explicit encoding schemes are 
required for each of these three conversion steps. But this entails particular challenges that 
are not always well considered. The explicit formulation of the operational definitions of the 
variables used in a study (i.e., encoding schemes for Conversion Step 2) is widely 
recognised as a standard task of any scientific investigation. Explicit encoding schemes are 
commonly established in studies applying qualitative methods where the individuals under 
study can freely decide which externalisations to use in their primary conversions of 
information from their psychical phenomena and where these externalisations are 
categorised and analysed such as using content analysis (Bauer & Gaskell 2000) but also 
statistical analyses of textual materials (Lahlou 1996, Neuman 2014). But standardised 
questionnaire methods with predetermined fixed answer formats, as frequently used in 
quantitative psychology, do not allow the individuals under study to use the externalisations 
that they deem most appropriate for encoding information about their psychical events. 
Rather, the externalisations that they can use are the data variables (i.e., questionnaire 
items) that are predetermined by the researchers. Thus, Conversion Steps 1 and 2 are 
inextricably merged. This precludes any opportunities to establish encoding schemes for the 
two different steps of conversions of information that are involved.  
Explicit encoding schemes for Conversion Step 3 specifying the researchers’ 
interpretations of the analytical results thus-obtained with regard to the psychical 
phenomena and events under study are frequently established. But many researchers do 
not provide evidence that the meanings that they personally or collectively as researchers 
reconstruct for the particular questionnaire items statements used as variables do, in fact, 
correspond to the meanings that the particular individuals under study construct for these 
particular statements (i.e., signs). Analyses of some widely used standardised “personality” 
questionnaires demonstrated that these often have fields of meanings for the individuals 
under study and that these fields often diverge from the psychological standard 
interpretations of these items (Arro 2013; Diriwächter, Valsiner & Sauck 2004; Rosenbaum & 
Valsiner 2011). This entails risks for all kinds of (anthropo-,) ethno- and ego-centric biases 
that researchers may (unintentionally) introduce into the generation and analysis of data (for 
examples in taxonomic research, see Uher 2014b in this trilogy). These biases may also 
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carry on to the interpretation of results as explored in parts II and III below. To help 
researchers to become aware of and to minimise potential biases, the individuals under 
study should ideally be involved at least in some extent without implying that their 
interpretations need to be accepted by researchers or be directly reflected in scientific 
theories as is already done in qualitative research (e.g., techniques of communicative 
validation, Flick 2008; Lahlou 2011). 
In studies allowing individuals to freely decide upon the externalisations used, 
explorations of how the individuals under study may convert information from their psychical 
events into externalisations (i.e., Conversion Step 1) face particular intricacies. These 
intricacies arise from the momentariness of psychical phenomena, which actually requires 
methods of nunc-ipsum introquestion. But attention and externalisation inevitably change the 
course of experiencings and this also hinders the real-time capture of externalisations of 
more complex experiencings (cf. Conversion Principle 1; Kant 1786; Wundt 1904). In 
methods of retro-introquestion, individuals are therefore asked—as soon as possible after 
the psychical events to be explored have occurred (e.g., after completion of a specified 
activity)—to reconstruct the particular experiencings just had (e.g., those that occurred 
during that activity), thus ex post facto and without disturbing the particular experiencings to 
be explored (Bühler 1907; Rosenbaum & Valsiner 2011). To facilitate reconstructions that 
are as accurate as possible given the inherent constraints, retro-introquestive methods rely 
on the activation of episodic memory (Lahlou 2011), and to reduce fallacies of memory 
(Schacter 1999), they rely on short-term memory retrieval. By contrast, self-report methods 
enquiring about individuals’ habitual experiencings (e.g., some “personality” questionnaires) 
rely on long-term memory-based introquestion through which individuals reconstruct the 
psychical representations (e.g., self-concepts, attitudes personal narratives) that they have 
developed from and about patterns in the occurrences of the experiencings that they had in 
the past.  
This complex constellation of challenges for establishing explicit encoding schemes 
for all three steps of conversions of information that are involved in explorations of psychical 
phenomena is further complicated by the fact that, unlike other scientists, psychologists 
explore the very principles and mechanisms by which human individuals perceive and 
conceive of physical and psychical phenomena, externalise the perceived events, and 
develop and use semiotic systems for their socially shared representation. At the same time, 
psychologists themselves are constantly and intuitively doing their own perceiving, 
constructing, converting and semiotic encoding.  
In the face of this bewildering constellation of various kinds of phenomena for which 
different metatheoretical properties can be conceived and in which information is being 
converted into phenomena with different frames of reference in explicit ways by the 
researchers and in implicit intuitive ways by the individuals being studied but also by the 
researchers studying them, it is all too easy to lose track of what kinds of phenomena are 
actually represented by particular kinds of encoded variables and data. Interpretations of 
results and models therefore require careful consideration of the particular kinds of 
phenomena that the encoded and reduced data and thus the findings obtained from them 
(can) actually reflect (examples from taxonomic “personality” research are explored in parts 
II and III below and 2014b in this trilogy; cf. also Gillespie & Zittaun 2010; Køppe 2012; 
Toomela 2011; Uher 2013; Valsiner 2012).  
 “Personality”: Metatheoretical definition and methodological requirements 
By far not all of the many fields of research exploring individuals are concerned with 
the properties that are specific and unique to single individuals. Explorations of “personality” 
and “personality differences” require metatheories and methodologies that differ from those 
that are required for explorations of the properties that are characteristic for most individuals 
of a given group (e.g., age, gender), community or species. The TPS-Paradigm for Research 
on Individuals explicitly considers this difference by providing both philosophy-of-science 
foundations for exploring individuals in general and, based thereupon, philosophy-of-science 
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foundations for exploring “personality”, which it metatheoretically conceives of as individual-
specificity. To be individual-specific, the—often probabilistic—occurrences of events must 
differ between individuals (i.e., are differential) in ways that are temporally stable for at least 
some time. Individual patterns that do not differ from those of other individuals and that are 
not stable at least over some period of time cannot be specific to a given individual (Uher 
2011a).  
The TPS-Paradigm emphasises that constructs of individual-specificity are developed 
not only by scientists but also by lay people; such everyday constructs and their encodings 
in everyday language are explored in lexical “personality” research (as analysed in Uher 
2014b in this trilogy). Depending on the particular philosophical presuppositions made, 
researchers but also lay people differ in which particular kinds of phenomena they construct 
individual-specificity (e.g., experiencing, “psycho-“physiology, behaviour, morphology). By 
contrast, the TPS-Paradigm refrains from focussing only on particular kinds of phenomena 
and conceives of “personality” as individual-specific patterns in all phenomena of the various 
kinds explored in individuals (Uher 2013, 2014a). It specifies metatheoretical and 
methodological principles for each given kind of phenomenon to provide coherent and 
comprehensive frameworks that researchers can use to explore their particular kinds of 
phenomena of interest and to establish links between lines of research exploring different 
kinds of phenomena. 
 The TPS-Paradigm highlights the metatheoretical fact that individual-specificity 
cannot be directly perceived because it is an abstract idea denoting particular constellations 
of differential, temporal and often also probabilistic patterns in the occurrences of events in 
various kinds of phenomena. The TPS-Paradigm also highlights that the identification of 
individual-specificity requires careful consideration of the particular constellation of the three 
metatheoretical properties that can be conceived for each given kind of phenomenon. 
Specifically, for scientifically quantifying momentary phenomena, the occurrences of defined 
events must be registered repeatedly and accumulated over time  (e.g., using the concept of 
time-relative probabilities). For identifying individual-specificity in all kinds of phenomena, 
scientific quantifications obtained for individual patterns must be compared between 
individuals, and the differential patterns thus-identified must be shown to be stable across 
time periods longer than those in which the measurements were first ascertained and in 
ways that are considered to be meaningful (e.g., defined by the strength of statistical 
correlations over specified time periods, Uher 2013, 2014a; Uher et al. 2013a).  
This metatheoretical definition of individual-specificity, the philosophy-of-science 
foundations for phenomenon-methodology matching and for scientific quantifications and the 
concept of time-relative probabilities allow researchers to explore individual-specificity not 
only in the average occurrences of defined events, but in momentary and fluctuating 
phenomena also in their variabilities and ranges within and between individuals and across 
different time periods, situations and/or different kinds of events (for details see part III below 
and Uher 2014a in this trilogy; empirical demonstrations are found e.g., in Uher, Addessi & 
Visalberghi 2013a). These differentiations are particularly important for the interpretation of 
findings with regard to the particular kinds of variations and structures that they reflect. 
The following (part II) applies the above-outlined fundamentals of the TPS-Paradigm 
to scrutinise the researchers’ interpretations of the “personality” taxonomies, constructs and 
data regarding the phenomena that these (can) represent and their suitability for exploring 
the mechanisms and processes that govern individual functioning and development. 
II) Interpreting “personality” taxonomies: Two major fallacies 
In taxonomic “personality” research, as the kind of phenomena being explored, the 
individual-specific patterns that occur in their variations and structures, and thus the 
methodologies that are required for empirical explorations are highly complex (for examples, 
see Uher 2014b in this trilogy), interpretations of the phenomena that are represented by 
particular data, findings and taxonomic models are prone to two major kinds of fallacies. 
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Fallacy 1: Interpretations as “traits”—description versus explanation 
“Personality” psychologists applying different methodologies to develop taxonomies 
(for details, see Uher 2014b in this trilogy) offer different interpretations of the phenomena 
that their particular “personality” models represent. Researchers using lexical physical 
system approaches rely on the person-descriptive words in the lexica to develop 
“personality” taxonomies. Metatheoretically speaking, these researchers explore the physical 
phenomena (i.e., material signs) that the individuals of a given language community have 
developed and use to externally and physically represent their socially shared 
representations of individual-specificity. Many prominent lexical “personality” researchers 
carefully emphasise the fact that language “provides a framework for description, but not 
necessarily for explanation” and therefore interpret lexically derived taxonomic models as 
representing “phenotypic personality characteristics” (Saucier & Goldberg 1996, pp. 24-25).  
Concepts of genotype versus phenotype: Are they still useful?   
Historically, ideas of “phenotype” refer to properties that are external to individuals’ 
intact bodies and thus directly perceptible in everyday life, whereas ideas of “genotype” refer 
to properties that, under these conditions, cannot be directly perceived and that may 
causally underlie the perceptible phenomena. But with increasing technological progress for 
investigations of internal physical phenomena (e.g., physiology), these differentiations 
become blurred. Researchers explore neurotransmitter systems as endo-phenotypes (cf. 
Uher 2014b in this trilogy) although these internal micro-level phenomena cannot be 
perceived with the naked eye; their exploration requires technical conversions into other 
kinds of phenomena that can be directly perceived. The term “genotype” increasingly refers 
exclusively to the molecules of nucleic acid (e.g., DNA). But information from these micro-
level molecules as well can be technically converted into information in other physical 
phenomena that are perceptible with the naked eye (e.g., crystallographic images of DNA 
molecules produced by X-ray diffraction; Watson & Crick 1953). Geneticists and 
epigeneticists are increasingly uncovering mechanisms (e.g., methylation) that can activate 
and deactivate DNA sequences temporarily or permanently during ontogeny (e.g., x-rays 
can cause mutations in the molecular structure of DNA). Should such phenomena be 
labelled “genotypic” or “phenotypic”—what is cause, and what is effect?  
Explananda and explanantia: Selective differentiation and erroneous blending   
Differentiations of explananda (i.e.,. the phenomena to be explained) from 
explanantia (i.e., the phenomena explaining them) as often made in the natural sciences 
(Hempel & Oppenheim 1948; Popper 1934) are always a matter of perspective. The TPS-
Paradigm emphasises that the status as explanandum or explanans is not inherent to the 
particular kinds of phenomena being studied. Rather, it is the researchers who decide what 
particular phenomenon they want to explain and that they therefore put in the focus of their 
exploration.  
The TPS-Paradigm emphasises that researchers of individuals must carefully 
consider in their explanatory concepts the peculiarities of living organisms (e.g., multi-
contextuality, emergence, self-organisation, dialectical processes). Specifically, in the given 
entity of elements considered, it may always be possible (and even if only conceptually) to 
isolate single elements from their compositional connections with other elements and to 
experimentally explore these (conceptually) isolated elements and their interactions with one 
another (e.g., by defining a particular element as dependent variable and others as 
independent variables in regression analyses). But these interactions may be different when 
researchers exclude some elements from the set of elements considered or when they 
consider additional elements from the particular entity under study (as e.g., in stepwise 
regression analyses). This is because in the compounded connections found in living 
organisms, the presence or absence of single elements or of single interrelations between 
them may fundamentally change the overall interactions of the same set of elements, 
yielding different properties and functionings (for details, see Uher 2014a in this trilogy;  
Lewin 1936; Rothschuh 1963).  
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The complex and holistic organisation of living organisms is an irreducible and 
inextricable matter of fact (Rothschuh 1963). Generating knowledge about individuals 
therefore entails particular challenges because researchers must make decisions about 
which particular kinds of phenomena they want to explain in the context of which particular 
other kinds of phenomena. Researchers must also make decisions about which of the 
manifold events of the phenomena to be explored they want to study for this purpose and to 
consider in their explanatory concepts. The rationales and approaches that researchers 
apply to select the particular phenomena and events to be studied in a given investigation 
therefore play crucial roles in the explanations they derive. These selection decisions 
presuppose metatheoretical concepts about the particular kinds of phenomena and the 
objects of research to be explored and about the particular methodologies that enable 
researchers to generate appropriate data on them (cf. phenomenon-methodology matching) 
These decisions also presuppose metatheoretical concepts about how to empirically reduce 
the information that can be obtained in this way and to derive abstracted information about 
the phenomena under study that may allow generalisations to be made at least to some 
extent (cf. Classes of selection approaches; Methods of data generation, and Reduction 
principles elaborated in Uher 2014b in this trilogy).  
These metatheories also influence—both explicitly and implicitly—the researchers’ 
interpretations of the results obtained and the explanations that they derive from such 
information. The interpretation of lexically derived taxonomic models as reflecting 
“personality attributes” (e.g., Saucier & Goldberg 1996) adequately considers the fact that, in 
everyday life, people can directly perceive in other (intact) individuals only phenomena that 
are located external to their bodies but not internal ones. Thus, people can form their 
impressions of other individuals only from their perceptions of others’ outer morphology, 
behaviours, artificially modified outer appearances and the physical phenomena of semiotic 
representations (i.e., behavioural and material signs) that they use. "Personality" could 
therefore also be defined, in a strict sense, as referring to individual-specificity in only those 
kinds of phenomena that are directly perceptible by individuals in everyday life conditions 
(Uher 2013). Many lexical “personality” researchers have also carefully pointed out that 
everyday language terms need not accurately represent external physical events and that 
these terms often have semantic fields of meaning (for details, see Uher 2014b in trilogy). 
These researchers also emphasised the fact that phenomena that are directly perceptible in 
everyday life conditions need not show one-to-one correspondences to phenomena that are 
not directly perceptible and therefore highlighted that lexical approaches “lead to data that 
need explaining, not necessarily to the modes of explanation” (Saucier & Goldberg 1996, pp. 
24-25).  
In everyday life, however, these basic metatheoretical issues are not well considered. 
People regularly make inferences—correctly or not—about others’ psychical events, even 
though they cannot perceive these events. People also regularly construct causal 
explanations of the external phenomena that they can directly perceive in other individuals—
most likely using abductive reasoning. Abduction is a special form of logical inference that 
seeks explanation in retrospect—from the facts found in the present, individuals generate 
hypotheses about possible causes that, necessarily, lie in the past. Therefore, the truth of 
abductively generated hypotheses is a priori uncertain; abduction is only a very first 
theoretical step in the processes of investigations that also involve deductive and inductive 
steps of reasoning (Lahlou 2011; Peirce 1901, CP 7.218; Valsiner 2012; Walach 2013). In 
line with the peculiarities of abduction, people tend to seek causal explanations for others’ 
external phenomena (e.g., individual behaviours) primarily in the kinds of phenomena that 
are not directly perceptible in everyday life (e.g., others’ psychical or internal physiological 
phenomena). Popular folk explanations of individual-specificity refer to various ideas about 
internal causal origins, such as those that are commonly called “personality”, “temperament” 
or “character traits” (Laucken 1974). 
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The fallacy of misplaced concreteness in ideas about “personality”   
From observations of particular events (e.g., behavioural acts), people develop 
summary descriptions that they lexically encode in abstract single words (e.g., “aggressive”, 
“friendly”). These abstract words enable efficient everyday communication, but are 
necessarily less specific and accurate than cumbersome detailed descriptions of the single 
events observed. When abducting possible explanations of observed events, people 
frequently interpret these conceptually and linguistically abstracted descriptions (cf. 
hypostatic abstraction; Peirce 1902, CP 4.227) as representing concrete properties of the 
individuals being described (e.g., “dispositions”, “traits”, “character”, “nature”), which is called 
the fallacy of misplaced concreteness (Whitehead 1929a).  
These reified properties—because they are mere abstractions—cannot be directly 
perceived. People therefore assume that these properties must be somehow internal to 
individuals, and this, in turn, suggests that they could be causes of the events observed, 
thus serving as explanations. Accordingly, people assume that, because an individual shows 
aggressive acts, it is aggressive, which explains why it behaves aggressively. Such 
“explanations” are necessarily circular. But despite their inexactitude and intrinsic circularity, 
abstractions and reifications substantially facilitate and accelerate communication about 
individuals in everyday life and often have sufficient utility for everyday life purposes 
(Goldberg 1981; Kelly 1955; Lahlou 1998). Reified abstractions can provide a sense of 
predictability and control in social interactions that individuals can use to proactively adjust 
their behaviours, especially given that all individuals of a given community share these ideas 
and (error prone) ways of everyday reasoning and also assume that they are shared by all 
(Laucken 1974; Lahlou 1998; Uher 2013, 2014b; Uher et al., 2013b). Thus, the individual 
development, and even more, the socially shared development of constructs of individual-
specificity, derived through mental abstractions of complex constellations in which 
probabilistic, differential and temporal patterns coincide in the occurrences of events in 
various kinds of phenomena, is not only an amazing—obviously uniquely human—ability (for 
details, see Uher et al. 2013b); it also fulfils important functions in people’s everyday lives 
(Goldberg 1981; Lahlou 1998; Uher 2014b).  
As members of their particular socio-linguistic communities, all researchers 
developed such everyday ideas and ways of reasoning in their pre-scientific lives. As 
scientists, they continue to intuitively use such ideas and ways of reasoning in their everyday 
lives (Allport 1937; Laucken 1974; Uher 2011a). Language forms such an integral part of 
conscious human thinking that the fallacy of misplaced concreteness is not easy to 
recognise, not even for researchers exploring the human mind. This fallacy is therefore 
widespread in science as well, especially in “trait psychology”. Specifically, previously 
developed human “personality” taxonomies were primarily derived from standardised 
assessments of person-descriptive statements or single words denoting “lasting personal 
traits” and “stable traits” in particular (for details, see Uher 2014b in this trilogy; cf. Allport & 
Odbert 1936; Cattell 1943). But stable personal properties of individuals (i.e., individual-
specific properties) refer to differential and temporal patterns that cannot be directly 
perceived; they can be derived only through abstractions from and comparisons between 
events, individuals and times. “Personality” descriptors can thus refer only to people’s 
psychically represented and lexically encoded constructs of individual-specificity. It follows 
that “personality” taxonomies derived from standardised assessments cannot reflect the 
phenomena in and of themselves that are described by the questionnaire item statements 
(e.g., individual-specific behaviours) but only summary-descriptions of the everyday ideas, 
knowledge and beliefs that people have developed about the patterns, events and 
phenomena being described (Uher 2013, 2014b).  
Some “personality” psychologists correctly interpret the taxonomic constructs that are 
statistically derived from standardised assessment data as descriptive summary constructs 
of folk ideas and everyday beliefs about individuals (e.g., McAdams 1992; Westen 1996). By 
contrast, some lexical “personality” taxonomists, among them proponents of the Big Five 
Model (e.g., Goldberg 1990; Saucier & Goldberg 1996), theoretically interpret assessment-
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derived taxonomic constructs as descriptive summary constructs of individual-specificity in 
phenomena that are directly perceptible in everyday life. This interpretation correctly 
considers the metatheoretical fact that assessment data can represent only descriptions 
provided by people but not explanations of the phenomena being described. However, it 
overlooks the metatheoretical facts that a) people cannot directly perceive individual-
specificity but can only psychically construct such patterns, and that b) people’s everyday 
language terms and thus their assessments often do imply (causal) inferences to and 
descriptions of possible underlying phenomena that are not directly perceptible in everyday 
life. Assessment-derived taxonomic models thus describe people’s theoretical ideas about 
and explanations of individual-specificity in various kinds of phenomena both directly 
perceptible and not perceptible in other individuals (e.g., behaviours, experiencings). But 
these taxonomies cannot describe individual-specificity in these kinds of phenomena in and 
of themselves (for examples, see Uher 2014b in this trilogy). 
Various kinds of explanatory circularity in “personality” research   
Some other “personality” psychologists, in turn, interpret the taxonomic constructs 
that are statistically derived from assessment data as reflecting concrete psycho-physical 
entities, mostly called “traits”7, which are internal to individuals and causally underlie their 
perceptible properties. Allport (1931), for example, conceived of a “trait of personality” as 
being “more generalised than a habit” (p. 368) and explicitly referred to it as a “generic term” 
(1966, p. 3), thus clearly conceiving of “traits” as abstracted summary constructs that are 
labelled with abstract terms. But at the same time, he interpreted “traits” as having “more 
than nominal existence” (1931, p. 368) and as referring to individuals’ “integrated structure 
within the skin” and their “real neuropsychic organisation” (1966, p. 2, p. 8). Proponents of 
the Five Factor Model similarly interpret “traits” as evolved psychical mechanisms that are 
adaptive, genetically influenced and acted on by natural selection (e.g., Buss 2009; McCrae 
& Costa 1997; Matthews, Deary & Whiteman 2003).  
These causal interpretations of “traits”, currently dominant in psychology, are 
structurally identical to and thus likely derived from the hypostatic abstractions enabled by 
human language and the patterns of everyday thinking and explaining that build on such 
abstractions (cf. Neuman, Turney & Cohen 2012). Specifically, “trait” psychologists interpret 
the structures that are latent to assessment data as reflecting structures that are latent to the 
particular phenomena that are being lexically described in questionnaire statements (e.g., 
individual-specific behaviours). But these interpretations overlook that a) lexical symbols 
denoting individual-specificity (e.g., “personality” descriptors, questionnaire items) cannot 
directly reflect the phenomena denoted in and of themselves because individual-specificity is 
not a concrete entity that could be directly perceived (cf. Ogden 1932 on Bentham’s theory 
of fiction). Individual-specificity is only an abstract idea that people construct from properties 
of individuals that are directly perceptible and from which they abstract particular patterns of 
their occurrences across events, individuals and times. Latent structures underlying 
assessment data can reflect at best implicit structures underlying people’s constructed ideas 
                                               
7
 The term “trait” has very different meanings that require careful differentiation. In biological research 
on individual differences especially in animals, “trait” primarily denotes a single datum encoding the 
occurrence of a particular behavioural event in an individual. In psychology, by contrast, the term 
“trait” denotes a construct of individual-specificity summarising multiple data of occurrences of various 
kinds of events in many individuals. These terminological differences have caused profound 
conceptual misunderstandings between biologists and psychologists (Uher 2011a). But also within 
psychology, connotations of “trait” vary. Some psychologists refer to “traits” as descriptive summary 
constructs denoting individual-specificity in phenomena that are directly perceptible (McAdams 1992; 
Westen 1996), whereas others refer to “traits” as individual-specificity in phenomena that are internal 
to individuals and causally underlie their perceptible properties (McCrae & Costa 1997; Matthews et 
al. 2003). To avoid misunderstandings and to refrain from implying a-priori assumptions about 
causality and stability commonly attributed to “trait”-concepts, some psychologists who interpret 
taxonomic constructs as descriptive summary constructs therefore refrain from using the term “traits” 
(e.g., Goldberg 1982; Saucier & Goldberg 1996). 
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and beliefs about individual-specificity. Hence, there is b) a fundamental circularity entailed 
in interpreting (i.e., reifying) the statistically derived summary descriptions of people’s 
everyday ideas as reflecting concrete psycho-physical entities that reside within individuals 
and that causally explain those directly perceptible phenomena from which people first 
developed their everyday ideas about individuals (for details, see Uher 2013, 2014b in this 
trilogy). Abstract descriptions of phenomena cannot serve as causal explanations of the 
phenomena that are being described (Mischel & Shoda 1994; Uher 2011a). 
Like all psychical phenomena, people’s everyday beliefs are located in their minds. In 
this regard, interpretations that describe assessment-derived taxonomic models as 
representing phenomena inside individuals’ bodies are correct. But psychical 
representations are outcomes, memorised resultants from the past cognitive processing of 
past experiencings (e.g., emotions). Reconstructing and retrieving memorised resultants is a 
psychical processing, an ongoing experiencing, but it is different from the original processing 
of past experiencings that have already ceased to be in and of themselves (see Uher 
2014a). Thus, even if particular psychical representations refer to individual-specificity in 
phenomena that are internal to individuals and introquestively accessible (i.e., one’s own 
experiencings) or even not accessible (e.g., others’ experiencings, one’s own or others’ 
physiology and inner morphology in everyday life conditions), these psychical 
representations are ideas that people have developed about individual-specificity in such 
phenomena; but they are not nor do they reflect these internal phenomena in and of 
themselves. Standardised questionnaire methods cannot be used to explore individual-
specificity in these internal kinds of phenomena (see also Uher 2014b in this trilogy). 
Differentiated psychical representations of particular properties that are perceptible in 
other individuals (e.g., behaviours, physiognomy) are developed through comparisons with 
general psychical representations of these properties, which serve as a kind of norm. For 
example, psychical representations of the behaviours of particular individuals are interpreted 
subjectively with reference to psychical representations of the behaviours that are commonly 
shown by the individuals of a given community. For this reason, even small differences in 
individuals’ behaviours can appear as salient in people’s psychical representations and what 
is considered salient may be even more pronounced in the socially-shared psychical 
representations developed by communities of individuals. This suggests that behaviours are 
more predictive of pertinent psychical representations than people’s psychical 
representations of individual-specific behaviours are predictive of individuals’ behaviours 
(Lahlou 1998).  
This important insight challenges the widespread practice in “personality“ psychology 
to use assessments of a person’s individual-specific behaviours that often implicitly also 
comprise causal assumptions (e.g., about underlying psychical phenomena) as independent 
predictors of that person’s behaviours (Lahlou 1998). In fact, this research practice reflects 
widespread “folk beliefs about intentional causality” derived from reifications of linguistic 
abstractions that inevitably result in circular explanations (Wagner 1994, p. 243). This 
practice has also been fostered by the scientific concept of “personality” as a causal 
determinant of individual behaviour (e.g., Allport 1937, 1966), a concept that is structurally 
identical to and therefore likely rooted in everyday thinking.  
No doubt, psychical representations, once developed, can also causally influence 
people’s behaviours (e.g., everyday ideas about socially accepted conduct). In this specific 
regard, causal assumptions are correct. But psychical representations cannot be considered 
to be determinants in terms of independent predictors of individual behaviour because they 
are derived from perceptions of individual behaviour. Such causal analyses are intrinsically 
circular even if the data are generated in different ways and may therefore appear to 
“originate from independent sources” (e.g., questionnaire assessments versus behavioural 
observations). Specifically, what people say or have previously said that they or others 
usually do is not independent from what they or others are observed to do in a given setting 
because people developed this knowledge from perceptions of their or others’ past 
behaviours (amongst others). Interpretations of psychical phenomena (both experiencings 
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and memorised resultants) as causes and of behavioural phenomena as outcomes ignore 
the fact that all kinds of phenomena, because they are bound to the individual, develop in 
tight interplays during ontogeny and therefore cannot be neatly separated into some 
phenomena that are always causes and others that are always outcomes. Such ideas reflect 
historical concepts of phenotype versus genotype and of explanandum versus explanans. 
But these ideas are undermined by people’s tendency to blend descriptions of phenomena 
with their explanation (e.g., by reifying descriptive abstractions as causal entities) as well as 
by technical advances that enable ever more differentiated explorations of internal physical 
phenomena.  
Standardised questionnaire methods further complicate the theoretical interpretation 
of empirical results. Specifically, they entail limitations for exploring psychical 
representations and their relations to other kinds of phenomena because people can report 
only those psychical representations that are consciously retrievable and lexically encoded. 
But a lexically encoded psychical representation is a “transformation of a perceptual 
representation and it is thus from this transformation that the structures inherent to language 
will produce the final form by imposing their own semiotic constraints8” onto the individual’s 
psychical representations (Lahlou 1998, p. 94).   
The different metatheoretical properties that can be conceived for psychical and for 
physical phenomena preclude one-to-one conversions of information between them, such as 
between psychical phenomena and lexical (semiotic) externalisations (Uher 2014a, b in this 
trilogy) or between psychical and physiological phenomena (cf. Zuckerman 1991). Based on 
erroneous interpretations of the structures that are latent to assessment data as being 
directly associated with structures in individuals’ psycho-physiological systems (e.g., 
neurotransmitter systems; Matthews et al. 2003), some researchers hoped to be able to 
develop standardised questionnaires as efficient tools for categorising individuals also with 
regard to their underlying psycho-physiology (cf. Eysenck 1947, 1990). For example, Allport 
(1966) interpreted “traits” as “cortical, subcortical, or postural dispositions having the 
capacity to gear or guide specific phasic reactions” (p. 3), but explored these “traits” primarily 
with standardised questionnaire methods rather than with psycho-physiological methods 
(e.g., electro-encephalography, EEG).  
Allport (1937) passionately advocated for a “psychophysical view of personality” (p. 
40) as he wanted to explore how an individual “really is”, detached from potentially 
erroneous social perceptions and judgement (p. 48). He strongly opposed the idea that 
“personality traits” represent mere social attributes because they inevitably comprise 
evaluation and judgement. Allport (1966) explicitly considered a “trait” as being “not 
synonymous with moral or social judgement” (p. 1). But if so, why did he primarily use 
standardised questionnaires—i.e., people’s judgements—to study “traits” although he had 
specified a broad continuum of 52 very diverse research methods for studying “personality” 
(Allport 1937, p. 370)? Allport rightfully objected that there “would be no perception at all 
unless there were something out there to perceive and to judge” (1966, p. 2). But he 
overlooked the metatheoretical fact that people cannot directly perceive and thus assess 
“personality” (i.e., individual-specificity) and others’ internal phenomena in everyday life and 
that any perception and judgement is inherently contextualised (Uher 2013) and therefore 
influenced by the particular judges’ anthropocentric (von Uexküll 1909), ethno- and ego-
centric perspectives (Uher 2014a in this trilogy).  
Hence, in many studies using “personality” questionnaire assessments, the 
metatheoretical assumptions underlying standardised questionnaire methods match neither 
the theoretical concepts used nor the theoretical interpretations of the empirical results 
obtained.  
                                               
8
 Translated original: “La représentation linguistique est une transformation d’une représentation 
perceptive, et c’est lors de cette transformation que les structures propres de la langue vont produire 
la forme finale en imposant leurs propres contraintes sémiotiques” (Lahlou 1998, p. 94).   
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Fallacy 2: Interpretations of variations and structures as properties within versus 
between individuals 
Exploring why individuals differ essentially involves explorations of why a given 
individual shows the particular kinds of differential variations that constitute its individual-
specificity. As individual-specificity inherently implies stability over some amount of time, this 
in turn requires explanations of how the individual-specific patterns function together as a 
whole within the given individual in the context of his or her particular life circumstances (see 
Uher 2014a in this trilogy). Allport (1937) considered explorations of “the order that is 
manifested in the single organism through the inter-relation of its bodily and mental 
processes” (p. 4) to be elementary tasks of “personality“ psychology. His theoretical focus on 
the single individual is also reflected in his widely cited definition of “personality” as “the 
dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine 
his unique adjustments to his environment” (p. 48, italics added). 
In exploring individual-specific functioning and development, researchers encounter 
particularly complex constellations of challenges. First, identifying individual-specificity in the 
kinds of phenomena that are commonly conceived of as “personality” requires probabilistic, 
differential and temporal explorations that are tightly interrelated. Importantly, single-case 
studies fail to disentangle individual-specific patterns from patterns that all individuals of a 
particular group, community or species show in highly similar ways and that are thus group-, 
population- or species-typical. The frequently expressed idea that results obtained in single 
case studies in humans describe individual-specific patterns is based on the philosophical 
presupposition that no human individual is like any other (as, e.g., in Stern’s 1911 concept of 
psychography in which a single individual is explored with regard to many properties). By 
contrast, the anthropocentrically biased philosophical presupposition that all individuals of a 
given nonhuman species are alike (e.g., grasshoppers) and that any variation between these 
individuals reflects mere random variation and measurement error led researchers to 
interpret single-case findings from this species as reflecting patterns that can be found in all 
individuals in the same ways but to ignore the idea that individual-specificity may occur in 
this species as well. Ethno- and ego-centric biases may influence researchers’ philosophical 
presuppositions, metatheories and methodologies in analogous ways (Uher 2011a, 2013, 
2014a).  
Identifying individual-specificity, as it implies differentiality, inherently presupposes 
between-individual analyses. But importantly, statistical structures latent to individual-
difference data should not be mistaken for causal explanations of the single individual from 
the sample studied (Block 2010; Giordano 2014; Toomela 2011). This widespread fallacy is 
structurally related to and likely derived from frequent reifications of abstract descriptions as 
causal entities of the described (cf. Fallacy 1). In addition, abstract descriptions of structures 
of temporally stable differences between individuals are mistaken for representing structures 
within the single individual that are causally related to the individual differences described.  
This fallacy is particularly difficult to recognise because individual-specificity 
inherently implies individual differences. This fallacy may therefore be derived from 
erroneous assumptions of structural isomorphisms between phenomena and events studied 
on different levels of analysis. Such assumptions can mislead researchers to make 
inferences from structures found on one level (e.g., the population or sample level) to 
structures on another level (e.g., the individual level) and vice versa. Commonly, those 
structures that are easier to explore, such as those occurring in directly perceptible 
phenomena (e.g., behaviours, behavioural and material signs), are used to infer structures 
that are more difficult to explore, such as those assumed to occur in phenomena that are not 
directly perceptible (e.g., psychical functioning). This type of fallacy is known to occur in 
different forms, such as when researchers erroneously project onto each other, for example, 
patterns of within-individual and between-individual phenomena (Moolenaar 2004; Toomela 
2011), patterns of between-individual and between-group phenomena (Thorndike 1939) or 
patterns of between-individual and between-culture phenomena (Hofsteede 2001). 
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Structurally related fallacies occur when researchers erroneously project patterns of 
aggregate-level phenomena onto occasion-level phenomena (cf. also Richards 1990), thus 
turning processes into static entities—i.e., entifying them (Valsiner 2000). The exploration of 
(e.g., microgenetic) processes is hindered by the widespread psychological practice of 
analysing primarily aggregate-level data (Molenaar 2004; van Geert & van Dijk 2002). 
Hindering is also the practice of encoding perceptible events a priori into more abstract data 
variables (e.g., by asking encoders or judges to mentally aggregate events) rather than 
encoding events into more specific variables first and introducing traceable abstractions only 
during data analysis (for details, see the BRxBS-Approach and Statistical context-based 
reduction principles elaborated in Uher 2014b in this trilogy). 
Further complicating constellations of challenges emerge when researchers aim to 
explore individual-specificity not only in individual averages, but also in within-individual 
variability and when they aim to explore individual-specific compositional structures in both 
averages and variabilities in different kinds of phenomena with regard to their integrated 
functioning and development in the single individual—i.e., their microgenesis (Aktualgenese) 
and ontogeny (Ontogenese; Abbey & Diriwächter 2008; Diriwächter & Valsiner 2008; 
Diriwächter, Valsiner, & Sauck 2004; Valsiner 1998, 2010; Wagoner 2009). Specifically, 
such explorations require analyses of temporal regularities and changes occurring within and 
especially beyond those time periods in which the individual-specific averages, variabilities 
and compositional structures were first identified. This means that temporal patterns are to 
be explored in patterns that are, in and of themselves, defined by certain temporal patterns 
(Uher 2011a, 2013, 2014a in this trilogy).  
For example, individuals may show individual-specific compositional structures in the 
average occurrences of particular behaviours as explored in individual-specific situation-
behaviour profiles or individual-specific behaviour (response) profiles within a given situation 
(e.g., individual-specific constellations of particular social contact behaviours that individuals 
may generally tend to show in interactions with strangers). Moreover, given that within-
individual variability often exceeds between-individual variability (Shweder & Sullivan 1990; 
Uher 2010, 2013), individuals may also show individual-specific compositional patterns in the 
variabilities and ranges in the occurrences of particular events (e.g., behaviours or 
physiological parameters). In addition to such compositional structures, particular 
consecutive patterns may be found in the occurrences of events that are specific to some 
individuals—i.e., individual-specific process structures (e.g., individual-specific patterns in 
the consecutive occurrence of particular social contact behaviours—in both individuals’ 
averages and their variabilities and ranges—over the course of single or repeated 
encounters during the early phases of relationship development).  
Differentiating between-individual variations in individuals’ averages from between-
individual variations in within-individual variability is important because within-individual 
variability may indicate ongoing processes and can reflect mechanisms and processes that 
may trigger and govern longitudinal change and development (Thelen & Smith 1993; van 
Geert & van Dijk 2002). For the same reason, differentiating compositional structures from 
process structures—in both individuals’ averages and variabilities (and ranges)—is 
important, in particular for developmental research. For example, different consecutive 
patterns may have different meanings for different individuals in particular contexts and may 
entail different opportunities and consequences for individuals’ future behaviour in the same 
or other contexts and thus for their ontogenetic development (Sato, Wakabayashi, Nameda 
et al. 2010; Valsiner 1987, 2000).  
III) Implications for research on individual-specificity (“personality”) 
The above-elaborated philosophy-of-science foundations have important implications 
for the research methodologies that are required to explore individual-specificity. Specifically, 
they highlight that the identification of individual-specificity inherently requires analyses of 
individual differences. But between-individual methodologies are not suited for exploring the 
functioning and development of a particular individual given that individuals, as living 
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organisms, are inherently self-organising and therefore self-referential to a considerable 
extent. But pure within-individual analyses, in turn, cannot be used to identify individual-
specificity, which is the core element of all “personality” concepts (Uher 2013). 
The TPS-Paradigm emphasises that between-individual methodologies and within-
individual methodologies each reveal different kinds of information about individuals and that 
both kinds of information are important for exploring “personality”. It therefore conceives of 
these methodologies as complementary to one another. Specifically, compositional 
structures and process structures of a particular phenomenon or organismal subsystem 
under study cannot be explored by using the same kind of methodology. For example, cell 
organelles can best be identified by dissecting and dyeing cell components. But the 
intracellular functioning of these organelles can be explored only in cells that are intact and 
alive as dissection destroys the interactions that are to be explored.  
Moreover, analogous to the uncertainty principle (German Unschärferelation, literally 
translated “relation of imprecision”) that Heisenberg (1927) established for research 
problems in quantum physics, the compositional structures and process structures of a 
particular phenomenon under study can seldom be explored simultaneously with the same 
precision. For example, fine-grained and comprehensive explorations of the compositional 
structures of the lexical systems in which communities of individuals encode their beliefs 
about individual-specificity (e.g., linguistic analyses of the person-descriptive words in a 
language) may occur at the expense of systematic explorations of how people use the 
particular lexical encodings in their everyday lives for exploring and reconstructing their 
pertinent belief systems (e.g., open-ended interviews, ethnological field observations). Both 
kinds of methodologies (and further ones) are necessary for comprehensively exploring 
people’s lexically encoded beliefs about individual-specificity (examples of such studies are 
discussed in Uher 2014b in this trilogy). Similarly, nunc-ipsum methods that record in the 
flow of momentary phenomena the occurrences of defined events over some amount of time 
produce log files of data that allow for precise explorations of both compositional structures 
and process structures. But the different analytical methodologies that are therefore required 
must be applied consecutively and in different steps.  
The Hourglass-Shape Methodology for comprehensive taxonomic explorations of 
individual-specificity 
To enable systematic explorations of both individual-specific compositional structures 
and individual-specific process structures, the TPS-Paradigm provides a three-step 
methodology—the Hourglass-Shape Methodology—in which between-individual 
methodologies and within-individual methodologies are combined complementarily with one 
another in three consecutive steps of exploration (see Figure 1).  
Methodological Step 1: Between-individual analyses for identifying individual-
specific and population-/species-typical compositional structures   
All explorations of “personality” require evidence of individual-specificity in the given 
phenomena under study. As individual-specificity denotes differential, temporal and (in 
momentary and fluctuating phenomena) also probabilistic patterns, the first step requires the 
generation of data on the phenomena and events under study in multiple individuals and on 
multiple occasions across time. Both differential analyses and temporal analyses are 
required to evidence possible individual-specific patterns in the compositional structures that 
can be found in the phenomena and individuals under study; for example, individual-
specificity in the time-relative probabilities to show particular social behaviours and to 
externalise particular kinds of experiencings in encounters with strangers.  
These explorations may comprise between-individual analyses of individuals’ 
averages and, in momentary and fluctuating phenomena, also of individuals’ within-individual 
variabilities across defined periods of time; such as by using the coefficient of variation, 
which specifies the standard deviation standardised by the mean (for details, see Uher 2013; 
for an overview of variability coefficients, see van Geert & van Dijk 2002). These between-
individual analyses may be based on both variable-oriented approaches and individual-
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oriented approaches. Variable-oriented approaches are applied by exploring the 
occurrences of defined events of the phenomena studied across the individuals studied in 
order to identify particular kinds of individual-specific variations (e.g., gradual or 
discontinuous between-individual variation) and particular kinds of interrelations between 
them (e.g., co-variation in the occurrences of different kinds of individual-specific variations). 
Individual-oriented approaches are applied by exploring each single individual’s 
configuration of the variants thus-identified across all defined events to identify individual-
specific compositional structures and types of individuals sharing similar compositional 
structures (for details, see Bergmann & Magnusson 2001; Bergmann & Trost 2006; Stern 
1911; Uher 2011a).  
Importantly, the identification of individual-specificity presupposes scientific 
quantifications to establish a common basis against which the occurrences of the 
phenomena and events under study can be compared across individuals and times as well 
as across different contexts, studies, etc. As specified in the TPS-Paradigm, this requires 
explicit definition of the sets of elements to be quantified (set-theoretic requirement), such as 
the elements of the set of behaviours B, of the set of behavioural situations S, of the set of 
individuals I and of the set of times T considered. It also requires specification of the physical 
standards of measurement against which the thus-defined elements are directly compared to 
obtain numerical data (algebraic requirement), such as standards of space (e.g., metric or 
arm length distance to define close proximity to others) or standards of time using the 
concept of time-relative probabilities (e.g., average duration of talking per hour, variability in 
heart beats per minute within an hour; for details, see Uher 2013). 
 
 
Figure 1 The Hourglass-Shape Methodology for Taxonomising Individual-Specificity: A Three-
Step Methodological Approach  
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Note. The Hourglass-Shape Methodology enables comprehensive taxonomic explorations of 
individual-specificity by complementarily combining with one another between-individual 
methodologies and within-individual methodologies in three consecutive steps of exploration in order 
to obtain different kinds of information about individuals and their individual-specificity. In Step 1), 
between-individual analyses are used to identify individual-specific and population-/species-typical 
compositional structures in various kinds of phenomena. In Step 2), within-individual analyses are 
used to explore how the particular individual-specific and population-/species-typical compositional 
structures identified in Step 1 function and develop together in the given individual studied both 
microgenetically and ontogenetically. In Step 3), between-individual analyses are used to explore the 
within-individual patterns identified in Step 2 for commonalities and differences across many 
individuals to identify basic process structures of individual functioning and development. 
 
Scientific quantifications are essential for disentangling individual-specificity from 
patterns that are characteristic of all individuals in a given community (e.g., local region, 
nation, language or sociocultural community) or species and that are thus population- or 
species-typical. The TPS-Paradigm refrains from presupposing that individual-specificity can 
be assumed in all kinds of phenomena for all individuals in populations of humans or any 
other given species; therefore, single-case studies cannot be used for studies of 
“personality”.  
Studies using scientific quantification demonstrate the fact that single-case studies 
cannot reveal which of the individual patterns found can be conceived as individual-specific 
and which are population- or species-typical. For example, from the finding that a particular 
person spends a daily average of 7 hours sleeping, 5 hours talking to others and 2 hours 
eating and washes her hands on average 13 times a day, it cannot be inferred that this 
person is more “sleepy” than “talkative” or that she is both of these more than she is 
“hungry”. Rather, these patterns may be typical of many people working in offices or as 
counter attendants on weekdays. The example also shows that different types of measure 
(e.g., durations, frequencies) result in different magnitudes of the numerical data obtained, 
thus precluding within-individual comparisons of the occurrences of events even if they are 
of the same kind of phenomenon (e.g., behaviours). The person in the example cannot be 
said to be more “cleanly” than “sleepy” just because the numerical score for the frequency of 
washing hands exceeds the numerical score of hours spend sleeping. (Differences in the 
magnitudes of occurrences of individual behaviours scientifically quantified in 146 
behavioural variables in different types of measure and obtained in 15 behavioural situations 
were shown in a study on capuchin monkeys and their individual-specific behaviours; Uher 
et al. 2013a, Supplemental Material).  
The imperative requirement of both between-individual comparisons and temporal 
comparisons in all explorations of “personality” may have been obscured by the wide-spread 
use of methods for generating numerical data that do not fulfil the set-theoretic and algebraic 
requirements of scientific quantification, such as Q-sort ratings or Likert-scale questionnaire 
assessments. Such methods preclude scientific quantifications of both occurrences of the 
phenomena under study and individual-specific patterns in these occurrences (as elaborated 
in Uher 2014a, b in this trilogy). Moreover, people are known to overestimate between-
individual differences because they psychically represent the individual differences that they 
frequently consider in their everyday lives for differentiating between highly similar 
individuals in more pronounced ways than can actually be found in the particular phenomena 
considered (e.g., lengths of human noses), thus attributing salience to minor between-
individual variations (Lahlou 1998; Uher et al. 2013b).  
Methodological Step 2: Within-individual analyses for exploring individual 
functioning and development   
The TPS-Paradigm emphasises that explorations of individual-specificity on the basis 
of scientific quantifications also reveal the ways in which individuals are similar to one 
another to a considerable extent—thus, about patterns that are population- or species-
typical. Commonly, such patterns are considered to be objects of research in fields devoted 
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to the general study of individuals (e.g., general psychology or biology) and are largely 
ignored in “personality” research.  
By contrast, the TPS-Paradigm highlights that population- or species-typical 
structures are vitally important for exploring individual functioning and development. 
Specifically, it presupposes that the functioning and development of individuals is largely 
based on compositional and process structures that are common to all individuals of a  
given species and that have evolved during the phylogenetic history of that given species. 
For example in the human immune system, several components that are highly individual-
specific (e.g., major histocompatibility complex, MHC) have been identified. But 
nevertheless, in all human individuals substantial parts of the immune system show highly 
similar compositional structures (e.g., white blood cells each comprise typical quantities of 
neutrophils, basophils, eosinophils, lymphocytes, monocytes and macrophages) and these 
different components show rather identical process structures (e.g., each kind of white blood 
cell shows a very specific kind of response to specific kinds of infectious organisms and 
foreign substances). The functioning and development of an individual’s immune system 
could not be explained by considering only his or her particular deviations from the human-
specific compositional and process structures of the immune system. Rather, both structures 
that are species-typical and structures that are individual-specific must be jointly considered. 
The TPS-Paradigm highlights that, in present-day’s humans, individuals also function 
and develop on the basis of compositional and process structures that are shared by 
members of their particular sociocultural community and developed during ontogeny. 
Specifically, to enable social coordination and joint activity between many individuals, 
sociocultural communities invest considerable efforts in the co-construction of psychical 
representations by their individual members, in particular though the development and 
propagation of semiotic representations (e.g., language) and though instructed learning. 
These socially shared psychical representations are targeted at the functioning and 
development of individuals in large and largely anonymous social communities that 
characterise most of present-day human societies (for details, see Uher 2014d). This is 
another argument supporting the insight that individual functioning and development cannot 
be explored on the basis of mere between-individual deviations alone as this is commonly 
attempted in “personality” psychology.   
In Step 2 of the Hourglass-Shape Methodology, the particular compositional 
structures identified in Step 1—both those shown to be individual-specific and those shown 
to be population- or species-typical—are therefore explored jointly for their functioning and 
development in a given individual in particular moments and situations (i.e., microgenetically) 
as well as over longer periods of time (i.e., ontogenetically). Thus, the between-individual 
explorations of Step 1 are systematically complemented by within-individual explorations in 
Step 2; these two kinds of exploration reveal complementary kinds of information that are 
both necessary for exploring individual-specificity. Specifically, Step 1 first identifies the 
individual-specific and population- or species-typical compositional structures that are then, 
in Step 2, further explored for within-individual processes either within the periods of time 
considered for the primary identification of individual-specificity (e.g., to study microgenetic 
processes) or over longer periods of time (e.g., to study processes of ontogenetic 
development).  
Importantly, both Methodological Steps 1 and 2 involve temporal analyses (except for 
explorations of phenomena that are temporally more extended such as individuals’ 
morphology, but this presupposes that the phenomena’s temporal extension is known a 
priori and thus involves temporal considerations as well). Temporal analyses are applied in 
Step 1 to first identify individual-specific patterns and in Step 2 to identify processes, 
changes and development in the individual-specific patterns identified.  
The joint analyses of interactions between elements of the phenomena under study 
that are individual-specific, and thus conceived of as “personality”, with elements that are 
population- or species-typical, and thus not conceived of as “personality”, constitute a 
fundamental difference to previous metatheoretical and methodological approaches in the 
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field. Previous approaches in which the structures that are relevant for exploring individual 
functioning and development are determined on the basis of between individual differences 
(e.g., Thorndike 1911) were rightfully criticised for mistaking between-individual structures 
for within-individual structures (cf. Fallacy 2). The TPS-Paradigm provides a coherent 
metatheoretical and methodological framework that enables researchers to avoid this fallacy 
while simultaneously considering the fact that individual-specificity cannot be identified 
without between-individual comparisons. The necessity to jointly explore individual-specific 
and population- or species-typical compositional patterns provides further arguments for the 
importance of broad-based and comprehensive selection approaches when making 
decisions about which particular kinds of phenomena and events to explore for individual-
specificity (cf. Classes of selection approaches in Uher 2014b in this trilogy). 
The exploration of individual functioning and development inevitably requires multiple 
research programmes that may each focus on different kinds of phenomena, groups of 
individuals, research questions and perspectives. All the more important therefore is the use 
of scientific quantification, not only to differentiate individual-specific from population- and 
species-typical structures, but also to establish direct comparability of findings between 
different studies and different lines of research. The concept of time-relative probabilities 
lays the foundations for establishing such comparability also in explorations of phenomena 
that feature units of variable spatial and temporal extension, such as by standardising the 
occurrences of defined events in terms of frequencies or durations per hour.  
Methodological Step 3: Between-individual analyses for identifying basic 
process structures of individual functioning and development   
The TPS-Paradigm highlights the metatheoretical fact that individual peculiarities can 
only be identified on the basis of differences between individuals. This also applies to the 
patterns of individual functioning and development identified in Step 2 that are therefore 
explored in Step 3 for commonalities and differences across many individuals in order to 
identify groups of individuals that share basic process structures in their microgenetic and/or 
ontogenetic development with regard to particular individual-specific variants (e.g., 
behaviours, morphology, externalised experiencings). Thus, in the Hourglass-Shape 
Methodology, the within-individual explorations of Step 2 are systematically complemented 
by between-individual explorations in Step 3.  
With these philosophy-of-science elaborations, the TPS-Paradigm demonstrates that 
neither a science exploring individuals in general nor a science exploring individual 
peculiarities (“personality”) contradicts the scientific dictum scientia non est individuorum.  
The metatheoretical elaborations clearly show that explorations of individual-specificity, 
because differential patterns are implied, inevitably require comparisons between individuals 
from which generalisations must be drawn to show whether particular patterns found in a 
given individual can be conceived as specific to that individual or whether these patterns are 
typical of many individuals of its kind and thus are not individual-specific. Moreover, because 
individual-specificity implies temporal and often probabilistic patterns as well, a science of 
individual peculiarities inherently involves abstractions from unique events. The fact that 
abstractions and generalisations are elementary to scientific explorations of both individuals 
and individual-specificity also arises from the peculiarities of living organisms. Specifically, 
the emergence of new properties, dialectical processes, multi-contextuality, self-organisation 
and partial self-referentiality, amongst others, contribute to the occurrence of irreversible 
processes of development that may be historically unique and never repeatable. Exploring 
such unique and never repeatable events without making any abstractions and 
generalisations would create information that is always outdated in the very moment in which 
it is obtained and thus, not applicable to subsequent and future events.  
Abstracted information and generalised models are necessarily less detailed than 
every concrete unique event from which models are derived. But models and theories are 
structured, orderly and subordinated representations of the multiple and the manifold found 
in phenomena and events under study (Rothschuh 1963). Developing structural models—of 
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both compositional structures and process structures—is thus an inherent task of a science 
concerned with individuals and their individuality.  
However, in the various kinds of phenomena in which individual-specificity is 
explored, between-individual variations of individuals’ averages, of their within-individual 
variabilities, functionings and developmental pathways are so complex that simple regular 
patterns may not be found or can be conceived only on very high levels of abstraction. But 
highly abstracted models often have only little explanatory value. Moreover, and importantly, 
they may also be prone to oversimplifying complexity and to representing only constructed 
regularity and structure (cf. law of least effort, Royce 1891; Uher 2014a in this trilogy). Thus, 
researchers of individuals must expect and accept to find some (at times even considerable) 
degrees of irregularity and non-structuredness in their empirical findings as is the case for 
researchers in many other disciplines as well (e.g., Caprara 1996). 
The status quo of the field: In what kinds of phenomena has individual-specificity 
been taxonomised so far?  
Most taxonomic analyses in ”personality“ psychology have relied exclusively on 
between-individual analyses so far and have thus have not yet moved beyond 
Methodological Step 1 of the Hourglass-Shape Methodology. This may have historical 
reasons. In separation from a General Psychology exploring the “average individual”, the 
subdiscipline exploring individual differences was called Differential Psychology (with various 
meanings; e.g., Stern 1911). When psychologists focused their explorations on the single 
individual and individual peculiarities, the subdiscipline became known as “Personality” 
Psychology (e.g., Allport & Vernon 1933; Allport 1937; Stern 1911, 1918, 1935). In the 
Anglo-American research area, ”personality“ psychology has largely become established as 
a summary label for both differential psychology and “personality” psychology, whereas the 
two disciplines are still differentiated, for example, in German-speaking areas9. But “these 
fields are by no means identical. … The problem of the organisation of individual functions 
has always eluded differential psychology” (Allport & Vernon 1933, p. viii-ix)—and still does 
so today. Labelling both disciplines as “personality” psychology hampers the already difficult 
recognition of the profound fallacies that characterise the field today and that effectively 
hinder the systematic taxonomic exploration of individual-specificity in all of the various kinds 
of phenomena, variations and structures commonly conceived of as “personality”. 
The inability of taxonomies developed only with between-individual methodologies 
(often called nomothetic methods) to describe or even explain processes of individual 
functioning and development was criticised often and early on (e.g., Allport 1937; Kelly 
1955). This explanatory deficiency promoted the further development of within-individual 
methods of exploration (often called ideographic methods; e.g., Diriwächter & Valsiner 2008; 
Salvatore, Gennaro & Valsiner 2013; Lamiell 1998) that, however, cannot identify individual-
specificity. In the last decades, the controversy on the utility of nomothetic versus 
ideographic approaches for exploring individual-specificity and the related controversy on 
quantitative versus qualitative methods got stuck in specifying and fortifying their 
oppositions. But defining positions—i.e., specifying thesis and antithesis—is only a first step 
in the dialectics of development. Science is no exception from this.  
The TPS-Paradigm moves these controversies on to a stage of synthesis in which 
new concepts can emerge by applying the epistemological principle of complementarity 
originating from quantum physics to elementary problems in research on individuals and 
individual-specificity. Importantly, complementarity does not mean to compromise between 
opposing perspectives and to combine elements of categorically different methodologies 
with one another as is sometimes proposed in the field. Rather, it means to specify the 
philosophical presuppositions that can be made about the phenomenon under study and to 
analyse on their basis the appropriateness of the metatheories and methodologies used for 
its exploration. Following this principle, the TPS-Paradigm elaborated philosophy-of-science 
                                               
9
 See, for example, the name of the author’s research group at FUB: Comparative Differential and 
Personality Psychology. 
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foundations of phenomenon-methodology matching on the basis of the three metatheoretical 
properties that it conceives for the phenomena explored in individuals. These elaborations 
demonstrated that the methodologies are unequivocally determined by the particular 
constellation of metatheoretical properties that can be conceived for a given phenomenon 
under study and that constitute its frame of reference. These elaborations also clarified that 
both between-individual and within-individual methodologies are required for exploring 
individual-specificity. But contrary to previous conceptual ideas, each given kind of 
methodology is appropriate for exploring only particular kinds of phenomena, variations and 
structures, revealing particular kinds of information that cannot be uncovered by the other 
kind of methodologies. In the Hourglass-Shape Methodology, between-individual and within-
individual methodologies are therefore selectively applied and complementarily combined 
with one another across three consecutive steps of exploration (cf. Uher 2013, Desiderata 
1d-g).  
The philosophy-of-science foundations of phenomenon-methodology matching also 
highlighted some far reaching consequences entailed by the reduction of the broad portfolio 
of methods that can be used for exploring individuals (cf. the 52 methods specified by Allport 
1937, p. 370) to primarily just one single class of methods—standardised questionnaires. 
Standardised questionnaire methods have allowed psychologists to generate enormous sets 
of data with a magnitude and efficiency previously unparalleled in the sciences. Data on 
hundreds of data variables for tens of thousands and even millions of individuals can be 
generated with hardly any effort on the part of the researchers (and even remotely, e.g., 
using online tools). Biologists and physicians, by contrast, would have to invest 
incomparably greater amounts of effort to generate similarly comprehensive data sets on 
individuals. These enormous psychological data sets have provided the empirical raw 
materials for important statistical developments, which are basic to and thus essential for 
many sciences. These data sets also laid the foundations for a plethora of theories and 
models that could be developed, tested, revised and applied. No doubt, standardised 
questionnaire methods have been an essential driving force for research in psychology over 
the last century.  
But this accelerated quantitative development in research activities has its downside. 
To this day, psychologists are unable to explain how the respondents actually generate their 
answers to standardised scales that researchers recode into numerical data (Rosenbaum & 
Valsiner 2011). In fact, this question has hardly ever been raised. The metatheoretical 
analyses presented in this trilogy showed that with a lack of elaborated and explicit 
conversion and encoding schemes that respondents apply when ticking off their answers to 
standardised scales, which particular phenomena and kinds of events are actually reflected 
by these data remain unknown. As the sets of events to be compared are unknown, and as 
no spatial units can be conceived for psychical phenomena that could be used as 
designated standards for comparing given events, the “psycho-metric” data that are 
generated with standardised questionnaire methods fail to fulfil the set-theoretic and 
algebraic requirements of scientific quantifications (see Uher 2014a, b in this trilogy).  
The widespread practice of using only those sets of questionnaire scales that 
produce data structures that match the assumptions of pre-existing statistical theories—
rather than the properties of the phenomena and events under study (for details, see Uher 
2014b)—has resulted in (necessarily) robust taxonomic structures of individual differences 
that are seemingly replicable across age-groups, nations, many languages, human cultural 
communities and even species (King & Figueredo 1997; McCrae 2011; McCrae & Costa 
1997; Terraciano et al. 2005). These robust findings result not only from the radical matching 
of the primary data generation to particular statistical theories but also from the fact that, 
contrary to widespread scientific interpretations, the data thus-created can reflect only one 
kind of phenomenon—people’s ideas and beliefs about individual-specificity (see below; for 
details Uher 2014b in this trilogy).  
The primary application of standardised questionnaire methods for developing 
“personality” taxonomies effectively prevented researchers from systematically taxonomising 
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also those kinds of phenomena that the majority of “personality” and “trait” psychologists 
commonly intend for their models to reflect—individual-specific behaviours, experiencings 
and functioning. As a consequence, appropriate taxonomic models describing compositional 
structures and process structures in individual-specific variants in all of the different kinds of 
phenomena studied as “personality” are still lacking. Investigations in which the 
complementary Steps 1 and 2 of the Hourglass-Shape Methodology are purposefully 
matched have to not yet been done.  
Step 1 and Step 2 methodologies are no doubt the most difficult steps to undertake, 
given the enormous effort required to generate (scientifically quantified) data on the kinds of 
phenomena explored in psychology (for details, see Uher 2014b in this trilogy). Once 
completed, Step 3 methodologies, as they involve analyses of data generated in Step 2, can 
be carried out in rather straightforward ways. These explorations will require collective efforts 
of researchers pursuing different lines of research and across different disciplines (see 
below). 
Everyday psychology and scientific psychology 
The insight that popular “personality” taxonomies can represent “only” people’s 
everyday beliefs and psychical representations about such phenomena is for many 
psychologists a deeply disappointing idea. Why? People develop ideas, beliefs and 
knowledge about phenomena and events that they encounter in their everyday lives. These 
psychical representations can help individuals to orient themselves in complex “worlds” and 
may also help them to predict future events—thus, psychical representations are highly 
functional for individuals (Lahlou 1998; Uher 2014b). They influence people’s perceptions, 
ideas, activities and decisions and thus their development (Kelly 1955; Larocco 2014; 
Valsiner 2000). A psychology devoted to exploring individual-specific functioning cannot 
ignore people’s systems of psychical and semiotic representations. Rather, comprehensive 
investigations of such systems can provide illuminating insights into the ways in which 
people perceive and conceive of their “worlds” (Laucken 1974). Exploring people’s everyday 
beliefs, psychical representations and knowledge about individual-specificity is therefore an 
elementary task for both differential psychology and “personality” psychology. Scientists 
invest considerable efforts in reconstructing and understanding the everyday beliefs of 
ancient cultural communities, often from not much more than some archaeological artefacts 
and fragments of old documents. At least an equivalent amount of effort should be devoted 
to exploring present-day humans’ everyday beliefs and knowledge about individual-
specificity because they play important roles in all areas of social life (cf. Uher et al. 2013b).  
Making everyday psychology an object of research should not be misunderstood as a 
lay psychological endeavour; much to the contrary, it is a deeply scientific one (Lahlou 1998; 
Laucken 1974; Moscovici 1961). In fact, as all scientific psychologists are everyday 
psychologists as well, it is a particularly challenging task to scientifically explore the 
everyday thinking patterns that are rooted so deeply in our everyday lives while avoiding the 
common fallacies often contained therein. Most likely as a response to the frequent objection 
that a discipline that explores individuals cannot be a science, scientific “personality” 
psychologists often strive to separate their discipline from everyday psychology. This 
becomes most strikingly apparent in many (especially quantitative) psychologists’ reluctance 
to involve in their research—at least to some degree—the individuals whose psychical 
phenomena are under study (as done in many qualitative methods; cf. Flick 2008). Instead, 
scientific psychologists often maintain a tensed and sometimes rather dismissive stance 
towards lay psychologists. But 
 
“… the psychologist, in spite of his profession, is not a superior judge of people. He 
should be, but his ascetic and meager formulae derived from ‘generalized mind’ do 
not go far in accounting for the peculiar richness and uniqueness of minds that are 
organic and single” (Allport 1937, p. 5). 
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At the same time, however, scientific psychologists do not at all hesitate to delegate 
to lay people the complex task of converting and encoding information from highly complex 
phenomena and events—some not even directly perceptible (e.g., others’ experiencings)—
into standardised data. The generation of data by lay psychologists has even become the 
standard “psychological” method on which much of today’s research on human “personality” 
is based. In fact, it is the “outsourcing” of the data generation to the individuals studied that 
makes the highly efficient creation of the large “psychological” data sets possible at all. 
Research on “personality” is intimately connected to people’s everyday beliefs, not 
only because beliefs form part of the set of phenomena commonly conceived of as 
“personality”. Individual-specificity is so central to everyday life that people’s interests in 
pertinent scientific results are particularly strong as becomes apparent in the frequent 
publications about “personality” in the public media and the popular science and advice 
literature. Scientific findings that become known to the public may become incorporated—
correctly and in biased ways—into people’s everyday beliefs and knowledge (e.g., ideas 
about heritability, terms such as Neuroticism and Extraversion). Thus, everyday knowledge 
is not independent of scientific knowledge, which entails further intricacies for its exploration 
(for details, see Uher 2013). But regardless of the origins of everyday ideas and beliefs, 
researching the structures of people’s psychical and semiotic representations and exploring 
how people use these representational structures in their everyday lives can provide 
profound insights into how people function as individuals and how they organise their daily 
lives, individually and as social communities (Laucken 1974; Lahlou 1998; Uher 2014d).  
The use of standardised questionnaire methods has effectively prevented 
researchers from fully exploiting the promising potentials that some selection approaches 
have for enabling systematic explorations of people’s everyday ideas about individual-
specificity (e.g., contextualised lexical physical system approaches or the BRxBS-Approach, 
described in Uher 2014b in this trilogy). The TPS-Paradigm provides philosophy-of-science 
foundations and clear-cut criteria that researchers can use to develop and select the 
methodologies that are matched to their particular phenomena of interest (cf. Uher 2013, 
Desiderata 1a, 1d-g). These foundations and criteria are aimed at reviving and broadening 
the portfolio of research methodologies that can and should be complementarily applied to 
explore individuals and their “personality and to develop comprehensive taxonomies of 
different kind. 
The diversity of taxonomic models required to explore individual-specificity 
For almost a century, many “personality” taxonomists have aimed to develop a 
“universal theory” or a “general model” of “personality” (Cattell 1965; Giordano 2014; 
McCrae & Costa 1997; McCrae 2011). Debates over which particular model is most 
comprehensive and appropriate have therefore been particularly intense (Uher 2014a).  
The elaborations presented in this trilogy clearly show that the metatheoretical 
properties of the different kinds of phenomena, variations and structures conceived of as 
“personality” require not only very different methodologies, but also different types of 
taxonomies. Hence, contrary to previous assumptions, it should not be the goal of differential 
psychology and “personality” psychology to develop one taxonomic model that best 
describes (and even explains) individual-specificity in humans of all age groups, national, 
language and cultural communities and that, moreover, covers individual-specificity in all 
kinds of phenomena that are commonly conceived of as “personality”. Instead, taxonomic 
models describing individual-specific compositional structures have to be developed for each 
of the various kinds of phenomena studied in individuals (i.e., morphology, physiology, 
behaviour, experiencings and memorised psychical resultants, semiotic representations, 
artificially modified outer appearances and contexts; cf. Uher 2013, Desiderata 2, 3, 5, 6, 
2014b in this trilogy). In addition, for taxonomising individual-specific variations in momentary 
and fluctuating phenomena (e.g., behaviours, experiencings), different models may be 
required to appropriately describe individual-specific compositional structures found in 
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individuals’ average occurrences of particular events and in their within-individual variabilities 
and ranges.  
Further models have to be developed to appropriately represent basic process 
structures in the functioning and development of particular compositional structures both 
individual-specific and population-/species-typical identified in Step 3 of the Hourglass-
Shape Methodology (e.g., micro- or ontogenetic processes in children showing different 
individual-specific and age-group-typical patterns in social, aggressive and explorative 
behaviours). Such models may describe interactive processes of individual-specific and 
population-/species-typical variants within one or even across multiple kinds of phenomena 
(e.g., between variants in behaviours, experiencings and physiology). Some models may 
thereby focus on microgenetic processes in particular tasks or situations (e.g., encounters 
with strangers) or on ontogenetic processes within and across different stages in individuals’ 
lives (Uher 2013, Desiderata 7, 8). Models of these kinds are already developed by other 
disciplines exploring individuals, such as in psycho-neuro-immunology where patterns of 
within-individual interactions between the psychical, the nervous and the immune system are 
studied and modelled both micro- and ontogenetically. Such integrative models have 
provided new knowledge about the molecular mechanisms that may mediate the still largely 
unknown interrelations between psychical and physical phenomena. These research 
approaches have opened up new avenues for exploring the functional relations between 
“body and mind” and for unravelling fundamental mechanisms and processes underlying 
individual-specific (pathologic) functioning and development (Ader 2006; Vedhara & Irvine 
2005).  
For all of these different types of taxonomies, different models have to be developed 
for particular groups of individuals that may be characterised, for example, by their age, 
gender, socio-economic class, nationality, language, political system, belief systems, 
historical era, and so on.  
Consequently, rather than developing one general model and a universal theory of 
“personality”, a multitude of specific models need to be developed. Ultimately, the central 
topic of differential psychology and “personality” psychology is the diversity and complexity 
of individuals. This diversity and complexity must be appropriately represented by the 
models and theories developed by researchers—but not in the diversity of models meant to 
represent the same kinds of phenomena and events as is currently the case because this 
reflects only diversity in the researchers’ philosophical presuppositions, implicit 
metatheoretical and methodological assumptions and their anthropo-, ethno- and ego-centric 
biases. More importantly, the diversity of models must represent diversity in the phenomena 
and events that are being represented and in the individuals that are being explored. The 
medical and biological sciences adequately consider this and develop a multitude of very 
specific models to represent micro- and ontogenetic mechanisms in very specific kinds of 
phenomena and events in particular groups of individuals. Their great advantage, however, 
is the physicality of their study phenomena, which substantially facilitates the development of 
explicit encoding schemes for converting information from them into semiotic systems and 
also allows for the development of automated technologies to carry out some of these 
conversions. The physicality of these phenomena also facilitates the ability to directly and 
intersubjectively test the appropriateness of these conversions of information for the 
purposes of scientific explorations and of the models developed therefrom.  
Looking at prominent “personality” taxonomies previously developed in psychology, it 
becomes apparent that most of the investigatory and taxonomic tasks required for 
comprehensively exploring the various kinds of phenomena, variations and structures 
conceived of as “personality” still lay ahead of psychologists. The establishment of 
standardised questionnaire methods as the standard psychological tools has seriously 
narrowed down the set of investigatory tools that psychologists use. Psychologists should 
revive the broad portfolio of methods that are available for exploring individuals as outlined, 
amongst others, by Allport some 80 years ago. In addition, contemporary psychologists can 
capitalise greatly on the enormous technical advancements recently made. Novel 
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technologies in physiological research, brain imaging and gene sequencing provide ever 
more detailed information on individual-specific compositional and process structures in 
internal physical phenomena. The increasing digitisation and computerisation of everyday 
life opens up fascinating new avenues for conducting real-life explorations of individuals’ 
behaviours, physiological patterns, experiencings, psychical and semiotic representations, 
outer morphology and artificially modified outer appearances and the everyday situations 
that people commonly encounter in their lives. Such explorations are enabled by novel 
recording techniques such as methods of first-person perspective digital ethnography 
(Lahlou 2011), life logging and reality mining (Dong, Lepri & Pentland 2011), ambulatory 
monitoring and experience sampling (Fahrenberg & Myrtek, 2001; Fahrenberg, Myrtek, 
Pawlik, & Perrez 2007; Mehl & Conner 2012) that enable detailed nunc-ipsum and/or retro-
introquestive recording of events.  
Major developments for unravelling the workings of the human mind are to be 
expected from the further development of microgenetic methods (Abbey & Diriwächter 2008; 
Diriwächter & Valsiner 2008; Diriwächter et al. 2004; Valsiner 1998, 2000; Wagoner 2009) 
and their systematic combination with these digital real-life recording techniques. Such 
pioneering techniques have already been developed in the field of subjective evidence-
based ethnography (Lahlou 2011; Lahlou, Nosulenko, & Samoylenko 2009). This new class 
of methods has been successfully used in various applied fields where accurate exploration 
of behavioural and psychical processes is of utmost importance, such as for the 
transmission of complex tacit knowledge in the nuclear industry (Le Bellu, Lahlou & 
Nosulenko 2010). These methods have also been successfully applied to explore 
behaviours, psychical processes, and psychical and semiotic representations that individuals 
are usually not always well aware of in their everyday lives, such as those related to eating 
and consumption behaviours (Lahlou 2008).  
IV) Conclusions from this trilogy of articles: Meta-Desiderata for future research on 
individuals 
The phenomena of life have evolved from the proven functionality of tight interplays 
between events of different kinds of phenomena (e.g., morphology, physiology, behaviour 
and the psyche). These interplays are so intricate that they are not directly apparent in 
conscious thinking. This is not surprising. Conscious thinking, in itself, is not a vital 
precondition for the development of organismal life; instead, it emerges only on highly 
complex levels of organismal self-organisation. The ways in which phenomena appear in 
individuals’ perceptions and everyday thinking are targeted towards their functionality for 
individuals’ lives, not towards differentiations and analyses that are accurate in a scientific 
sense. The different metatheoretical properties that can be conceived for the various kinds of 
phenomena that are involved in individuals’ organismal existence and the complex functional 
interplays between these different kinds of phenomena are therefore not readily apparent. 
This entails particular challenges for those individuals who aim to scientifically explore these 
phenomena. To master these challenges, three meta-desiderata are primary. 
Consider the metatheoretical properties that can be conceived for the different kinds 
of phenomena studied  
The TPS-Paradigm that is applied for the analyses presented in this trilogy (Uher 
2014a, b) defines and differentiates from one another seven kinds of phenomena explored in 
individuals: morphology, physiology, behaviour, the psyche, semiotic representations, 
artificially modified outer appearance and contexts. Their definitions and differentiations are 
based on three metatheoretical criteria: the phenomena’s spatial location in terms of their 
internality/externality to the physical entity of the individual under study, the phenomena’s 
temporal extension and their physicality versus “non-physicality”. The analyses have shown 
that the diverse constellations of these metatheoretical properties that can be conceived for 
the different kinds of phenomena entail peculiarities for their accessibility by human 
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perception in everyday life and for the opportunities to convert information from them into 
other kinds of phenomena—thus for the methodologies enabling their scientific exploration.  
The analyses have also highlighted essential differences between particular kinds of 
phenomena that are commonly not well differentiated in psychology, such as between 
experiencings and memorised psychical resultants, between experiencings and behaviours 
or between behaviours and psychical representations of behaviours. The analyses also have 
highlighted that, conversely, other kinds of phenomena are often conceived of as being 
mutually exclusive even though this is not metatheoretically tenable and entails circularity in 
exploration, such as dualistic conceptions of the individual versus “the environment” or 
“personality” versus culture (Shweder & Sullivan 1990; Uher 2014a; Valsiner 1987). 
Interestingly, the insights gained here using purely philosophy-of-science analyses are well 
in accordance with insights gained in epigenetics that likewise do not support dualistic 
conceptions of individual versus “environment” (cf. Jablonka & Lamb 2005).  
Careful consideration of the metatheoretical properties that the TPS-Paradigm 
conceives for the various kinds of phenomena under study—in the light of the philosophical 
presuppositions on which these conceptions are based—is essential to systematically 
explore these various kinds of phenomena and their interrelations and to become aware of 
and minimise the various types of biases that are rooted in researchers’ everyday abilities to 
perceive and think. 
Match methodologies to the metatheoretical properties conceived for the phenomena 
under study 
The philosophy-of-science analyses presented in this trilogy have also illuminated 
general principles that underlie any scientific investigation (e.g., phenomenon-methodology 
matching, scientific quantification, basic conversion principles, metatheoretical 
commensurability, Uher 2014a; selection approaches, methods of data generation, reduction 
principles, Uher 2014b). The elaboration and explication of these metatheoretical and 
methodological principles is important to create knowledge and an understanding of the 
ways in which particular methodologies and methods enable researchers to investigate 
particular kinds of phenomena. In fact, careful analysis and consideration of the 
metatheoretical properties that can be conceived for particular kinds of phenomena may also 
be used for the targeted development of new methodologies and methods in the future.  
With the establishment of standardised questionnaires as the standard methods of 
psychological investigation, the actual meaning of methods as means and tools of 
investigation have fallen largely out of sight in psychology. Instead, researchers explore 
phenomena for the mere sake of their accessibility by particular methods rather than 
designing the methods according to the particular metatheoretical properties that can be 
conceived for the phenomena under study (Omi 2012; Toomela 2009, 2011; Westen 1996). 
The decisive task that lies ahead in psychology is to avoid fitting the generation of data to 
statistical theories and to generate empirical data that appropriately represent the 
phenomena and events under study—as they occur in the individuals under study and 
especially under real-life conditions—no matter what distributions and statistical properties 
these data may show (Uher et al. 2013a, 2013b; Uher 2014b in this trilogy).  
No doubt, psychology and especially applied psychology require tools that enable 
efficient investigations of individuals. But such tools can be developed only after the 
phenomena and events of interest have been comprehensively explored and taxonomised. 
Only when the properties of the phenomena and events under study and the patterns of their 
common occurrences in the individuals under study (ideally in real-life settings) are known 
and systematised can tools that enable efficient investigations be designed. By using 
standardised questionnaire methods, psychologists have tried to perform these two steps at 
the same time. As people can directly perceive only the outcomes of their conscious thinking 
about individual-specificity in the various kinds of phenomena that are commonly 
constructed and lexically encoded as “personality” but not individual-specificity in these 
phenomena in and of itself, the generation of data was radically matched to these outcomes 
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of conscious thinking rather than to the occurrences of individual-specific patterns in the 
actual phenomena under study.  
For the same reasons, the medical statistically-based classification systems of 
somatic and mental disorders (e.g., International statistical classification of diseases ICD-10, 
WHO 2010; Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders DSM, APA 2000) and the 
medical models and theories about the causal mechanisms of disorders were not derived 
from standardised questionnaires about patients’ self-reported symptoms that were designed 
to match pre-existing statistical theories. Instead, people’s diseases were first explored with 
methods that were designed to investigate the particular morphological, physiological, 
psychical and/or behavioural phenomena occurring in particular clinical conditions and to 
explore and model the micro- and/or ontogenetic mechanisms and processes involved in 
their pathogenesis. Only thereafter could researchers develop standard diagnostic tools 
enabling the efficient investigation and categorisation of individuals, including symptom 
checklists that could also be completed by patients to obtain a first overview. The final 
diagnosis is still left to the physician’s holistic view on the single individual. The most recent 
revisions of the DSM have shown that the classification systems of the DSM are being 
continuously and critically debated; many open controversies have still not been solved and 
further changes and developments will be made in the future. By contrast, many 
“personality” psychologists consider the taxonomic task of their field to be already completed 
with the establishment a few taxonomic models (or even just one “universal” taxonomy) and 
the development of a few corresponding questionnaire scales (McCrae 2011). 
Critically question the established standards and one’s own explicit and implicit 
presuppositions time and again 
All sciences have developed methods that were later found to be inappropriate for 
exploring the phenomena of interest. Science is exploration, discovery of the unknown. Re-
search includes errors and failures by definition. If the success of every development were 
certain, it would not be re-search. Therefore, an essential if not the essential element of any 
kind of research is to make explicit the philosophical presuppositions that are made in a field 
and the metatheories and methodologies that are therefrom derived and to continuously 
scrutinise and further develop these elementary thinking tools as they are the very means by 
which any research is done. As Allport (1937) wrote almost 80 years ago: 
 
“The obscurantist of any generation, says Whitehead [1929b], are in the main those 
scientists who practice relentlessly the dominant methodology, failing to speculate 
freely upon its limitations and possibilities for improvement. From this point of view, 
the present chapter, wholly concerned with the methodology of rating, testing, and 
experimenting, may be considered partly as a protest against current obscurantism in 
the scientific study of personality. But with the passage of time, the principles here 
set forth may in turn become outmoded. If so, they should then be altered or 
discarded lest they in turn obscure the path of progress” (Allport 1937, p. 462-463). 
 
The transdisciplinary and philosophy-of-science perspectives adopted in this 
research helped to clarify and provide a better understanding of the origins of many fallacies 
that are deeply rooted in our everyday thinking and that are also widespread in 
contemporary research on individuals and their “personality”. Recognising and evading 
these fallacies requires careful consideration of one’s own personal beliefs and patterns of 
thinking, again and again anew. Whatever new insights emerge in science, researchers 
should check whether the ideas and ways in which they explore phenomena do in fact help 
them to appropriately represent the phenomena that they aim to explore. This applies in 
equal measure to all concepts and ideas presented in this trilogy (cf. Uher 2013, 
Desideratum 1g). 
Finally, we should always consider that all sciences that we make are always 
explorations done from the particular perspective and by the particular abilities of the human 
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primate Homo sapiens sapiens. Any explorations that we will do and any scientific theories 
and models that we develop will always be products of the human ways of thinking. 
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